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Origin, scope, and features of this doctoral research 
 
Undertaking a doctoral research in economics and statistics had been part 
of my interests for a long time, immediately after the conclusion of my 
masters’ degree. Due to professional and personal factors, this project 
could only materialize a few years later, in the academic year 2014/15, 
when I joined the University of Salerno as a PhD student.   
The main motive to start a doctoral research path for me was to strengthen 
my technical background and skills in statistics and quantitative 
economics. I have worked as a development economics professional since 
2007, initially at the United Nations and more recently at the World Bank 
Group. In my work, I have dealt with economy policy issues on a daily 
basis; this often takes the form of economic diagnostics and policy advice 
resulting from an analysis of in-country specific issues as well as sourcing 
from international benchmarks and cross-country evidence. Against this 
background, developing a strong understanding of econometric and 
statistical approaches can indeed bring significant value added to my 
expertise, and provide me with more apt tools to operate as a well-rounded 
development economist.  
This research path has also allowed me to be regularly in touch with the 
academic world, including other PhD candidates, research assistants, and 
faculties. This exchange over time has been extremely rich and greatly 
benefited the progression of my work. In addition, the possibility of 
publishing the results of my research activity on scientific 
statistical/economic peer reviewed journals, has represented a great 
opportunity, as it allowed me to contribute more meaningfully to foster 
opportunities for knowledge-sharing through academic platforms. In this 
respect, it seems worth noting that the first paper of this monograph was 
accepted and published by the “International Journal of Business and 
Management”1, and that the second paper was accepted to the peer 
reviewing phase by the “Oxford Economic Papers” and currently awaits 
final feedback. The three chapters composing this monograph have also 
been individually presented at various national scientific conferences on 
statistics and economics in Italy, as well as they have all been published 
as work in progress under the World Bank Research Working Paper 
Series.  
One of the main elements that has characterized this doctoral research 
project has been an in-depth country knowledge and hands-on 
development economics expertise. This means that in often cases, due my 
professional duties, I have had an opportunity to access to unique (and for 
the larger part, not public) datasets. This has added interest to the research 
and anchored it to concrete policy questions. This permitted to orient the 
research by actual facts rather than by goals with a high degree of 
abstraction. In conclusion, on of the leitmotivs of this monograph is that 
various statistical methodologies were selected and adapted to factual 
cases rather than the other way around, which adds policy relevance to the 
findings and makes the research especially meaningful.  
 
 
Synopsys of this work  
 
Societies strive to achieve socio-economic systems that provide equal and 
broad-based opportunities to their people. The concept of “equal 
opportunities” is a very complex one, and encompasses many definitions 
and several different areas of life. ‘Equal opportunities’ does not only 
mean to be able to access basic services and ideally with the same quality 
                                                          
1 See Volume 12 N. 9 (2017) 
standards; it may also mean to find a decent job and lead fulfilling 
professional lives, or also to thrive personally, without facing 
discriminations or – essentially – moving from the expectation that – if all 
people are indeed equal – conditions should be such that (while people 
cannot systematically have the same starting points in life) the resources 
available and the sociopolitical-economic principles that govern life may 
help level off the playing field, and provide a fair chance for success to 
all, without distinctions. Analyzing equality of opportunities has typically 
translated into the utilization of complex statistics, ranging from 
concentration indexes (e.g. the Gini coefficient) to sophisticated modeling 
of growth patterns, poverty outcomes, human behavior and social justice 
principles.  
A quick overview on the main thinkers on inequality cannot fail to omit 
John Rawls. In his “Theory of Justice”2, Rawls asserts that nobody is truly 
“created equal”, at least not from morally. Individuals are randomly born 
and unconsciously placed in various households, which reflect a number 
of differences related to gender, race, income, etc. Also, the socio-political 
institutions that may allow individuals to move along the spectrum of 
opportunities (and thus ‘equality’) are often reachable through financial 
means (e.g. schooling), which leads Rawls to highlight the important of 
social cooperation to mitigate such structural moral injustice. At the same 
time, Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, in his famous “Inequality 
Reexamined”3, put the accent on what type of equality a society seeks; to 
do this, he delved into the diversity of mankind and their features. Sen 
asserts that, when we consider inequality, we should focus on the diversity 
among people’s capacities (so-called “capability approach”) and 
characteristics, rather than their welfare or financial means. In doing this, 
                                                          
2 Cfr. : “A theory of justice”, by John Rawls - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
- 2003 
3 “Inequality reexamined”, by Amartya Sen - Oxford Univ. Press - 2004 
Sen was among the first to look at inequality from the perspective of 
gender. An interesting angle is debated by John Roemer4, who 
distinguished a notion of time in the debate on equality. Roemer asserts 
that the concept of “equality of opportunity” is based on a ‘before’, i.e. 
ahead of the competition among individuals, and an ‘after’, i.e. when the 
competition has started. In the former segment, Roemer advocates for an 
equalization of opportunities, supported by policy interventions if needed, 
while in the latter segment, individuals should compete based on a 
nondiscrimination principle, and only on the qualities that are relevant to 
the competition in question (which means, excluding any other attributes 
such as sex, race, income, etc.).  
The three papers presented in this monograph intend to discuss this 
question from selected and very distinct perspectives: 1) how (and if) 
financial access benefits peoples’ wellbeing; to do this we applied an 
econometric framework to a case-study based on Mauritania; 2) how 
natural resource endowment is correlated with economic growth and 
inequality indicators; in this case we adopted a global perspective and 
utilized a dataset covering over 40 countries; and 3) if tax incentives can 
be an effective tool in achieving economic growth in an way that does not 
distort competition among enterprises; also in this case we utilized a case-
study approach, focusing on the experience of the Dominican Republic, to 
try and determine policy lessons. 
More specifically, the first paper presented in this monograph evaluates 
the impact of access to credit from banks and other financial institutions 
on household welfare in Mauritania. Household level data were used to 
evaluate the relationship between credit access, a range of household 
characteristics, and welfare indicators. In order to address the risks of 
potential endogeneity, an index of household isolation was used to 
                                                          
4 “Equality of opportunity”, by John E.Roemer - Harvard University Press - 1998 
instrument access to credit. As we conducted the analysis, we also 
provided evidence on the validity of the exclusion restriction, by showing 
that household isolation is unrelated with households and area 
characteristics six years prior to the measurements on which this analysis 
is based. In a nutshell, results show that households with older and more 
educated heads are more likely to access financial services, as are 
households living in urban areas. In addition, the analysis shows that 
greater financial access is associated with a reduced dependence on 
household production and increased investment in human capital. The 
policy conclusions from our analysis appear to support public sector’s 
strategies for expanding financial infrastructures in underserved rural 
areas, as this is expected to translate into improved wellbeing for the local 
population. 
In the second paper, the analysis examines the relationship between 
nonrenewable resource dependence, economic growth and income 
inequality. Using a dataset that includes information on 43 countries, 
going from 1980 to 2012, the paper estimates several model specifications 
in order to check the robustness of the results under many different 
assumptions. The analysis also accounts for income-group-related 
heterogeneity among countries, trying to understand whether structural 
characteristics of a nation (e.g. its institutional capacity, its development 
stage, etc., proxied in this case by the income level) can contribute to 
explain how growth, inequality, and resource endowment interact with 
each other. Innovating on a large strand of literature based on cross-
sectional analysis, this second paper tackles the potential time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity, thus exploiting the panel of the data. The 
findings show that the empirical relationships are associated with the level 
of economic development. Among higher-income countries, greater 
dependence is associated with lower income inequality, while no 
statistically significant correlation exists with GDP per capita. Among the 
lower-income group, greater dependence is associated with both higher 
levels of income inequality and lower per capita GDP.  
Finally, the third paper evaluates the impact of fiscal incentives on firms’ 
performance in the Dominican Republic. In recent years, the Dominican 
government has approved several new corporate tax benefits. While the 
literature on value-added tax incentives is extensive, the impact of 
corporate tax incentives is less well studied and is the subject of an 
ongoing debate. Using firm-level panel data from 2006 to 2015, this 
analysis uses a propensity score matching to investigate the relationship 
between tax incentives and firms’ performance, considering the measure 
of Liquidity, GFSAL, ROS, ROA, STS and Turnover as proxies of firms’ 
welfare. The results manage to single out the effect of tax expenditure and 
show – more specifically – that the Corporate Income Tax exemptions 
positively impacts the firms’ welfare. This evidence is corroborated both 
by a Nearest Neighbor Matching and a Radius Matching methodology, as 
well as it is supported by the balancing test. 
 
Quick overview of statistical approaches used in this monograph 
 
This monograph utilizes a wide range of statistical approaches to 
undertake economic analysis. This section will present the main ones, 
providing an overview on their main characteristics as well as advantages 
and/or limitations. 
First of all, the analysis makes ample use of descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics are very diverse techniques that are used to describe 
the basic characteristics of a dataset. Descriptive statistics provide a 
simple synthesis of the sample and of the measurements collected. 
Together with simple graphic analysis, they represent the initial starting 
point for any quantitative data analysis. Descriptive statistics should not 
be confused with inferential statistics. While the former are mostly 
presenting a description of what is being observed or what the main data 
traits are, the latter will try to reach conclusions that extend beyond the 
data collected and which can be to some extent valid also beyond the 
specific study or experiment that concretely motivated them. In other 
words, descriptive statistics represent and synthesize a set or sample of 
data relating to a given population (‘population’ should be intended as the 
totality of cases, i.e. all the units on which a variable of interest can be 
detected). 
This study also widely utilizes regression analysis as a technique used to 
exploit a set of data that consists of a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables. The purpose of regression analysis is to estimate a 
possible functional relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. In short, the dependent variable (in the regression 
equation) is a function of independent variable(s) plus an error term. This 
latter is a random variable and represents an unmanageable and 
unpredictable variation in the dependent variable. A number of control 
variables or parameters are typically also estimated to best describe the 
dataset. One of the most commonly used methods in the regression 
analysis is the "least squares" (OLS) approach, although several other 
methods are also used. The essential advantage of regression analysis is 
that it can be used to make predictions, as well as to test hypotheses, or to 
model dependency relationships. The analysis in this monograph also 
utilizes two among the main alternatives to the pooled OSL model, the 
Fixed Effects Model, and the Random Effects Model. 
Looking at the fixed effects model, the main concept is fundamentally that 
it is possible to break the error term u (i.e. all non-observable variables), 
in two components, ε and α : 
𝑢(it) = α(i) + ε(it) 
Where α is the part of the error dependent on the observed unit(s), 
including the effect of all non-observable variables, and ε is the part of the 
peculiar error of the observation. The fixed effects model essentially 
focuses on the elimination of the α intercept5, constant over time, as it 
contains non-observable values and would therefore be considered an 
integral part of the model error. These values could be correlated with the 
explanatory variables x(it), returning a distorted estimate. Excluding the 
term αi is achieved based on a data demeaning process6. Also the random 
effects model, like the fixed effects model, breaks down the error term 
u(it) into two components ε(it) and α(i). However, an intercept is explicitly 
introduced in the model: 
𝑦(𝑖𝑡) = β(0) + β(1)𝑥(𝑖𝑡,1) + ⋯ + β(𝑘)𝑥(𝑖𝑡,𝑘) + α(𝑖) + ε(𝑖𝑡) 
So that it is possible to assume that that E(αi) = 0.  In the fixed effects 
model we try to exclude the term α(i), as that is supposed to be correlated 
with one or more explanatory variables. Assuming that α(i) is not related 
to any explanatory variable in all t periods, any modification that excludes 
the term α(i) would lead to an inefficient estimator. When we use a random 
effects model, unlike the fixed effects model, α(i) is not treated as a fixed 
variable(s), but as a random one (which explains why the designation of 
“random effects”), which are not correlated to the regressors. By doing 
this, these effects can be treated in the model as if they were part of the 
error term. The next step is thus processing data and obtaining a dataset 
with non-autocorrelated errors. Since the processed data satisfy the 
assumptions of the Gauss-Markov's theorem, and the final 
estimates/results can be regarded as efficient. 
The “Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation” is another estimator that 
this monograph utilizes. It represents a linear regression model consisting 
                                                          
5 Given a function 𝑦(𝑖𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑖𝑡)𝛽 + 𝛼(𝑖) + 𝜀(𝑖𝑡) 
6 which consists of subtracting the group mean from each of the variables and in 
estimating the model without intercepting through the OLS pooled estimator. 
of several equations, each of which has their own dependent variables. 
Each of these equations may be estimated individually, and may also have 
different explanatory variables. This is the reason why the model is called 
“seemingly unrelated”. However, the error terms are assumed to be 
correlated across the various equations. In other words, the M equations 
may result to be “unrelated” in the sense that no simultaneity exists among 
the variables in the system as well as that each of the equations have their 
very own explanatory variables. The various equations would still be 
probabilistically correlated, by means of the errors that are correlated 
throughout the model’s equations. 
The SURE can be regarded as a model made up of “M” multiple 
regression equations of the following form: 
 
where y(ti) is the tth observation on the ith dependent variable (to be 
explained by the ith regression equation). The term x(tij) represents the tth 
observation in jth  explanatory variable, while β(ij) is the coefficient 
associated with x(tij) for each observation, and finally ε(ti) is the tth value 
of the disturbances component associated with the equation under 
consideration (i.e. ith ). Summarizing, one could think of the SURE model 
as a very specific case of simultaneous M equations, with M jointly 
dependent variable and k distinct exogenous variables, and in which no 
endogenous variables appear as explanatory in any of the structural 
equations. 
The first paper presented in this monograph largely resorts to the use of 
Instrumental Variable (IV), which is one of the most important and 
applied techniques used in econometrics. The main advantage – and 
reason why – the researcher utilizes IVs is endogeneity, which means that 
the researcher realizes the possibility that endogenous variables that are 
influenced by other variables within the model, may be present. In other 
words, the risk would be that then, the regression estimates may measure 
just the magnitude of association, instead of the magnitude and the sign of 
the causation (which is what we need for policy analysis). If we consider 
a dependent variable y and a single regressor x, the instrumental variable 
(or more simply the “instrument”) can be defined, as “z”, which has the 
property that any changes in z will be reflected in changes in x, but will 
not lead to any changes in y. Consequently, z will be uncorrelated with the 
error terms u. The following diagram can help summarizing this 
definition: 
 
In more formal terms, given a scalar regression model with the following 
form:  
y = βx+u 
a variable z is called an instrument or instrumental variable for the 
regressor x , if it respects two conditions: a) it must be uncorrelated with 
the error term u; and b) it is correlated with the regressor x. More 
specifically, the first condition guarantees that the selected instrument z is 
also a regressor in the model for y, because if y depended on both x and z 
and y is regressed on x alone then z would be absorbed into the error term, 
and consequently z would be related with the error term. The second 
condition simply states that there must be some level of correspondence 
between the instrument and the variable being instrumented. One main 
advantage of the IV estimation is that (like the “Propensity Score 
Matching” that will be described right after), IVs can fine-tune the model 
for both observed and unobserved confounding effects, which means that 
they come on help when there are conditions that may influence both the 
dependent variable and independent variable, thus causing a spurious 
association. Other statistical approaches exist for adjusting for 
confounding effects, such as the stratification or the multiple regression 
methods, however these cannot adjust for unobserved confounders. This 
is what makes IVs particularly helpful in actual/factual applications, when 
the researcher is investigating matters related to observational data, which 
are likely indeed to be influenced not only by observed confounders but – 
in particular – by nonobservable ones. To conclude, one should note that 
IVs are better suited as an estimator technique when the sample size is 
sufficiently large. In addition, if the instrument is weak and/or if the 
relevance of confounders is large (or both) it is likely that the resulting 
standard errors will also be significant, which would translate into 
imprecise and biased results. Therefore, IVs are preferably to be used 
when only moderate to little confounding effects are assumed to exist. 
As previously mentioned, also the Propensity Score Matching is mostly 
used to analyze the causal effect of a treatment using observational data. 
In other words, the dataset is not generated by an experiment (so-called 
randomized) but was collected through surveys, experiments, and/or 
administrative records; this last case is the one of the third paper in this 
monograph. Matching procedures are used in those situations when the 
researcher wishes to estimate the impact of a given treatment on a certain 
output. A large literature exists on the conceptual problems related to the 
assessment of the impact of a treatment through microeconometric 
instruments (essentially individual-level surveys), and it points out to 
fundamental mismeasurement potential issues. For example, one of the 
most common limitations in this sense is the “self-selection”. A typical 
example is that of an individual enrolling in vocational training. It is likely 
that this individual carries more motivated than a number of individuals 
who do not enter the program. This is to say that, while – in an ideal world 
– assessing a casual treatment effect should be operated by calculating the 
average difference between the outcomes by the participants after 
treatment and the potential that they would have achieved assuming 
(theoretically) that they had not received the treatment, in the actual world, 
it is possible to obtain information about the outcome of the treated 
individuals and the about the outcomes from a second group of individuals 
who did not receive the treatment. The Propensity Score Matching comes 
in help to solve these methodological issues: if a matching process allowed 
each individual (observed in the treatment group) to be associated with an 
individual in the untreated group that has the most (possible) resembling 
pre-treatment features, then the limitations described above would be – at 
least to a certain extent – excluded or reduced. In order to do this, it is 
important that two conditions are respected. The first condition is that the 
vector of variables on which the matching (x) is going to be conditioned, 
should be independent from the treatment. The second condition is that 
also the output distribution (conditioned by the set x) is independent from 
the treatment. More specifically, this second condition is known in the 
literature as “CIA” (that is, Conditional Independence Assumption) and is 
indeed of crucial importance, since only if the CIA is respected the 
selection of individuals can be expressed as a function of pretreatment 
features exclusively. The typical situation faced by micro-economists is 
that in which three variables of interest X, Y, Z are used, but the database 
in use does not contain (at all, or just partly) any joint observations of these 
three variables. Let us suppose that two distinct surveys exist, one 
containing the variables X and Y, and the other one containing X and Z. 
In order to integrate the two datasets, the researcher can assume that the 
information contained in X is adequate to determine both Y and Z; in other 
words, we move from the assumption that Y and Z are independent vis-à-
vis X; i.e.: 
P (Y, Z | X) = P (Y | X) P (Z | X), 
which is a hypothesis entirely equivalent to the CIA. The next step is to 
define a criterion (or a set of criteria) to match the variable Z (that is 
associated with an individual in the second group, which is most similarly 
conditioned by a set of common variables X) to each individual in the first 
group. This process is clearly more efficient than undertaking a new 
survey (whether at all possible) that would contain all the variables in an 
integrated database. Ultimately, the propensity score of a unit (may this 
be treated or untreated) is essentially the probability that a unit is assigned 
to the treatment given its characteristics prior to treatment. More formally 
this can be expressed as follows:  
 
supposing that we have a binary treatment T, an outcome Y, and 
background variables X. While most of the literature on ‘score matching’ 
has essentially been developed as a response to an impact assessment of 
economic treatments, more recently the interest on such statistical 
approaches has also grown in other sectors, as this type of procedures 














Chapter 1:  
“An Assessment of the Access to Credit - Welfare 














The international literature on financial access and development has not yet 
identified a direct, unequivocal connection between household-level credit 
and improvements in poverty and inequality indicators. For example, Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) found that financial access is correlated 
with lower rates of poverty and income inequality, while Honohan and King 
(2012) showed that the use of formal banking services is associated with an 
increase in individual monthly income. The World Bank’s Global Financial 
                                                          
7 This analysis was conducted jointly with Alessandra Amendola, Marinella Boccia, all affiliated to the 




Development Report of 2014 finds that financial inclusion plays a central role 
for development and poverty reduction. Considerable evidence shows that the 
poor benefit significantly from basic payments, savings, and insurance 
services; however it also highlights that microcredit experiments draw a 
mixed picture about the development benefits of microfinance projects 
targeting specific population groups. 
Many studies have focused on the role of microfinance in poverty reduction, 
and again the positive evidence on welfare is encouraging. (Note 1)Moreover, 
given the locally specific nature of both poverty dynamics and microfinance 
institutions, evidence is difficult to compare across cases, and there is no 
consensus regarding the effect of microfinance on growth and inequality. 
Illustrating the complexity of isolating the direct antipoverty effects of 
microfinance, Morduch (1998) found that “the most important potential 
impacts [of microfinance] are thus associated with the reduction of 
vulnerability, not of poverty per se, [because] the consumption-smoothing 
[effect] appears to be driven largely by income-smoothing, not by borrowing 
and lending”. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of financial access, as 
measured by credit from banks and other financial institutions (Note 2), on 
household welfare in Mauritania. The potential endogeneity of access to 
credit is addressed using an instrumental variable approach. The analysis 
draws on data from the Ongoing Survey of Household Living Conditions 
(Enquête Permanente sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages, EPCV) 
implemented by the National Statistics Office (Office National de la 
Statistique, ONS). The 2014 EPCV covered 9,557 households across 13 




The Mauritanian credit market is shallow, fragmented and overwhelmingly 
informal. Few formal credit providers operate in Mauritania, and most bank 
branches, ATMs and other financial infrastructure is confined to the capital, 
Nouakchott. There are also important cultural barriers to credit access—
including a strong gender dimension—as well as pervasive information 
asymmetry between potential borrowers and lenders, and a generally poor 
legal and governance framework. Mauritania’s informal financial sector is 
extensive, but produces little reliable data. Informal finance is typically 
offered on simple terms and frequently involves family connections, tribal 
affiliations or other networks of social trust. Due to data limitations this 
analysis concentrates exclusively on the formal credit sector. 
Among the limitations of this paper is the lack of panel data. Comparing the 
evolution of agents over time would add valuable information; however, 
current data do not allow the exploitation of longitudinal dimension. For 
future research to address these shortfalls, it will be critical to enhance the 
quality and the availability of official data. In this respect, a strong political 
commitment and consequent financial engagement to prioritizing statistics 
are key prerequisites for the revitalization of the analytical efforts that can 
support decision-makers improving the nexus between financial access and 
welfare. 
 
2. The International Literature on Financial Access and Poverty 
Most research on the relationship between financial access and poverty relies 
on standard welfare indicators such as household consumption, expenditure 
and income. Some studies show that the use of formal banking services 
increases individual monthly income (Honohan and King 2012), while others 




inequality, inferring that the use of financial services has a disproportionately 
positive impact on the poor (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2007). There 
is also evidence that financial access is linked to improvements in the severity 
of poverty (Honohan 2004). Research conducted in  Pakistan and India 
reveals that the expansion of rural financial services is associated with 
improvements in household welfare (Khandker and Faruqee 2003) and that 
the development of bank branches increases non-agricultural economic 
output and reduces rural poverty (Burgess and Pande 2003). 
Microfinance has been hailed as a vital tool for the economic empowerment 
of poor households. Research has shown that access to microfinance 
correlates with rising household income and consumption levels, less severe 
income inequality and enhanced welfare (Mahjabeen 2008). Studies have 
found a positive relationship between household characteristics, borrowing 
patterns and expenditure levels (Giang et al. 2015). Substantial research has 
focused on the issue of endogeneity in access to credit, and studies have 
shown that access to credit significantly influences economic incentives at the 
household level, improving consumption (Pitt and Khandker 1998) and 
altering positively consumption and investment decisions and impacting rates 
of wage growth and capital formation (Kaboski and Townsend 2012). 
However, not all studies have found a positive correlation between financial 
access and improved poverty indicators. Some analyses have failed to show a 
relationship between microfinance and household welfare, and find that 
access to credit has a limited impact on per capita incomes, food security and 
on the nutritional status of credit program beneficiaries (Diagne and Zeller 
2001). Others have revealed a regressive distribution of benefits (Mosley and 
Hulme 1998). Moreover, methodological issues remain a serious concern. 




that microfinance has had enormously positive effects among borrowers. 
However, the rigorous evaluation of such claims of success has been 
complicated by the endogeneity of program placement and client selection, 
both common obstacles in program evaluations. In this context randomized 
control trials provide an ideal research design to evaluate the impact.” In an 
effort to increase the analytical rigor of financial access studies, researchers 
turned to randomized controlled trials. This methodology has been used to 
estimate the impact of access to microcredit by comparing outcomes among 
a random sample of individual borrowers to those of non-borrowers with 
similar socioeconomic characteristics. Some of these studies have found that 
access to finance produced measurable benefits in the form of increased 
employment and food consumption (Karlan and Zinman 2010), other have 
displayed a significant impact on investment by small business, on profits by 
pre-existing businesses, as well on expenditure in durable goods, but not on 
consumption (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan 2015). Overall, these 
studies provide strong empirical evidence for a positive correlation between 




Causal conclusions of this work rely on the ability to instrument for access to 
credit. (Note 3)  More in general: “Microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically 
choose to locate in areas predicted to be profitable, and/or where large impacts 
are expected. In addition, individuals who seek out loans in areas served by 
MFIs and that are willing and able to form joint liability borrowing groups (a 
model often preferred by MFIs) are likely different from others who do not 




results of most evaluations could not be interpreted as conclusively causal 
because of the lack of an appropriate control group” (Desai, Johnson and 
Tarozzi 2014). In the absence of an experimental design, this issue is 
addressed by using the household isolation level (HIL) to instrument for 
access to credit. HIL is defined by using a number of indicators – self-reported 
by households – on the distance from various institutions and service 
providers. We assume that credit institutions have approximately the same 
average distance from households, and on these bases we move to estimate 
the relationships between access to credit and (i) consumption of household 
production, (ii) household total spending on non-durable goods and services, 
(iii) food spending, (iv) education spending and (v) poverty incidence. 
The exclusion restriction states that the HIL affects household welfare only 
through its effects on access to credit. The validity of such restriction is 
ensured by controlling for all unobservable variables through area-level fixed 
effects. Unfortunately, data limitations in the panel structure of the dataset 
prevented us from using household-level fixed effects or longitudinal 
information to address the endogeneity problem. Nevertheless, this analysis 
provides evidence in favour of the exclusion restriction, showing that the 
exogenous variability was unrelated with households and with local patterns 










4. Country context: Mauritania 
This section provides a broad overview of the country’s characteristics and 
describes the patterns of the banking sector and access to finance. 
4.1 Macroeconomic overview 
Mauritania is a Sahelian country on the West Coast of Africa with a land area 
of approximately 1 million square kilometers, most of which is covered by 
the Sahara desert, and a population of roughly 3.6 million. (Note 4) The 
country has urbanized rapidly since the 1960s, and its population is now 
largely concentrated in Nouakchott and other major cities such as 
Nouadhibou and Rosso. 
Mauritania has experienced robust growth in recent years driven by a thriving 
natural resource sector and high international commodity prices. However, 
recent global price shocks have underscored the country’s high degree of 
external exposure, which is magnified by a lack of diversification. Mauritania 
also faces exogenous vulnerabilities related to its ecology and geography, 
which make it especially sensitive to climate change, and it has a history of 
political instability, which is exacerbated by an inherently volatile system of 
tribal loyalties, an informal racial hierarchy, the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Maghreb region and persistent tensions with Morocco 
over Western Sahara. 
Poverty is most pervasive and extreme in rural Mauritania, with some of the 
highest rates registered in the southern regions bordering Senegal. While 
overall poverty is declining, a combination of continued rural-urban 
migration and the volatility of the resource-based urban economy may be 
causing a gradual increase in urban poverty. Nevertheless, most of the 
country’s poor are concentrated in rural areas. (Note 5) About 30 percent of 




force. The capital-intensive mining sector is unable to absorb a rapidly 
growing number of low-skilled workers, and about 85 percent the labor force 
is employed in the informal economy, particularly semi-subsistence 
agriculture. (Note 6) 
An adverse business and investment climate undermine Mauritania’s 
economic competitiveness, slowing the growth of its small formal sector and 
inhibiting diversification. In the mid-2000s Mauritania’s manufacturing and 
retail trade sectors included fewer than 250 formal firms with more than 5 
employees. (Note 7) Burdensome procedures for paying taxes, resolving 
insolvency, starting a business, trading across borders and obtaining credit all 
present serious obstacles to formalization and expansion, particularly for 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
4.2 Access to the Finance and Banking Sector 
The World Bank’s Doing Business report cites access to finance as the top 
constraint on the Mauritanian private sector. (Note 8) The banking industry is 
dominated by a few very large firms, which concentrate almost exclusively 
on serving specific commercial and industrial groups. Prospective borrowers 
who do not belong to these groups face considerable difficulty in accessing 
financial services. (Note 9) Major firms also tend to enjoy strong political 
connections, which they can use to protect themselves from competition. As 
a result of regulatory barriers and governance issues Mauritania ranked 168th 
out of 189 countries in the 2016 Doing Business report. 
The 2016 Doing Business report ranked Mauritania 162nd out of 189 countries 
in terms of the ease of getting credit, and its scores on several other financial 
indicators compare poorly with the average for Sub-Saharan Africa and most 
comparator countries. Information asymmetry is a major obstacle to financial 




a verifiable credit history. While credit to the economy has grown rapidly, 
increasing by 300 percent between 2005 and 2014, financial deepening in 
Mauritania has been far slower than in peer countries. The financial system is 
dominated by banks, and its structure evolved significantly in recent years, 
following the establishment of the state-owned Deposit and Development 
Fund (Caisse de Dépôts et de Development, CDD) in 2011, and the entry of 
several new commercial banks, some foreign-owned. 
The small size, shallowness and fragmentation of the Mauritanian financial 
system are major impediments to the development of financial intermediation 
services. The assets of the country’s largest bank amount to just US$320 
million, and total banking-sector assets are estimated at less than US$2 
billion. Financial infrastructure is limited, and cash remains the most common 
means of payment in the domestic economy. The insurance industry and 
pension schemes play a very minor in the financial system, and the ability of 
banks to play a decisive role in supporting private-sector development is 
limited by nonperforming loans, which remained high at over 20 percent of 
total loans in 2013, though down from 45 percent in 2010. 
In 2013 banking-sector assets represented 38 percent of GDP, and credit to 
the private sector represented 26 percent. (Note 10) The return on assets stood 
at 2 percent, and the return on equity was 9 percent. In recent years interest 
rates on credit declined from 15 percent to 10-12 percent as new banks entered 
the market. However, rates vary little based on counterparty, maturity or type 
of financing. Headline profitability is mediocre, limiting both the sector’s 
potential for organic growth and its capacity to absorb shocks. The absence 
of a market for short-term liquidity is a major impediment to the development 
of intermediation. Indicators of access to financial services in Mauritania 




The country’s microfinance sector is similarly underdeveloped. In 2013 there 
were 31 registered microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Mauritania, 10 of 
which were in the process of losing their licenses. Most MFIs are small, and 
the country currently has only one large microfinance network, the Public 
Credit and Savings Fund Promotion Agency (L'agence de Promotion des 
Caisses Populaires d'Epargne et de Crédit, PROCAPEC). Nevertheless, the 
total number of MFI clients increased from 139,000 in 2006 to over 200,000 
in 2014, and MFIs now account for about 5 percent of all loans and 2 percent 
of all deposits. MFI loan maturities range from 3 months to 2 years, and rates 
for small businesses average 16 percent. MFIs also provide savings 
accounts—though these are limited to very short-term non-remunerated 
deposits—and offer money transfers. Islamic financial products are common, 
especially non-interest-bearing rent-to-own agreements (murabaha), which 
represent over 74 percent of PROCAPEC loans. (Note 11) 
Mauritania’s financial sector also faces challenges relate to its geographic 
isolation, hard infrastructure gaps and general lack of technical capacity. 
Bank credit to the private sector is overwhelmingly short-term, and 
information asymmetry severely limits its allocative efficiency. Lack of 
information about potential borrower leads banks to disregard SMEs in favor 
of large, well-established firms. As a result, informal financing, including at 
the international level, is often the only option available for Mauritanian 
SMEs. Low individual bancarization rates represent a major additional 
constraint on credit access. Information technology is limited, clearing 
systems mostly rely on manual entry, and electronic payment instruments are 
seldom utilized. The government recently began preparing a credit card 
system in collaboration with the private sector, but this effort is still in its 




of contracts, and the legislative framework for protecting creditors’ rights is 
virtually nonexistent. 
 
5. Household Characteristics, Poverty Incidence and Credit Access 
The analysis presented below is based on the Mauritania EPCV for 2014. The 
survey is the result of a partnership between the ONS, the Ministry of 
Economic Development, the World Bank, and Afristat. The survey covers a 
wide range of socioeconomic variables collected through questionnaires 
administered to households and communities. The “basic indicators of 
wellbeing” module contains data on household composition, labor, education, 
social capital, health, access to services and credit. The “revenue and 
expenditure” module includes information on spending, consumption, 
transfers and income. The household represents the statistical unit of analysis. 
Of the 9,557 households surveyed in the 2014 EPCV, 55.3 percent were in 
urban centers and 44.7 percent were in rural areas. As a secondary source of 
information, the analysis is based on data from the 2008 EPCV. This 
household survey shares the same structure as the 2014 one, and consists of 
13.738 households. The two surveys are cross-sectional representative 
samples of the underlying population. In the following paragraphs, a number 
of descriptive statistics set the stage for the main empirical analysis, which 
will be presented in the next section. 
Mauritanian households are generally organized according to a traditional 
patriarchal model. Sixty-eight percent of households are headed by men, and 
32 percent are headed by women. Household size is clearly correlated with 
poverty, and poverty incidence increases linearly with the number of 
household members. Households headed by married people tend to both 




people. Polygamy is relatively common in Mauritania, and polygamous 
households tend to be among the largest and poorest in the country. Poverty 
rates declined among all household types between the 2008 and 2014 surveys, 
with medium-sized households showing the greatest degree of improvement 
(Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Poverty Incidence by Household Size 
 
The poverty incidence does not appear to depend on the gender of the 
household head. Male-headed households tended to be marginally poorer 
both in 2008 and 2014, even when controlling for household size. The age of 
the head of household also appears to have no effect on poverty levels. 
Welfare indicators improved among all age groups in 2014, but households 






Figure 2. Poverty Incidence by Age Group of Household Head 
 
Households headed by public employees had the lowest poverty rates. 
Households headed by private employees had higher rates, followed by 
households headed by self-employed workers outside the agricultural sector. 
Households headed by self-employed workers in the agricultural sector were 
the poorest, and their poverty incidence was even higher than that of 
households headed by unemployed workers or non-participants in the labor 
force. Finally, households headed by unemployed individuals registered an 
increase in the incidence of poverty, likely reflecting a severe drought that hit 
































Figure 3. Poverty Incidence by Occupation 
 
The education level of the head of household is negatively correlated with 
poverty incidence. Primary education is compulsory in Mauritania and lasts 
6 years. Secondary school covers a period of 6 or 7 years, depending on 
whether the student opts for a Professional or Technical Baccalaureate, or a 
full Baccalaureate. Tertiary education typically lasts 3-6 years; advanced 
degrees are very rare and are usually obtained from the University of 
Nouakchott. In addition to the formal school system, traditional qur’anic 
schools (madrasas) are common in Mauritania. Figure 4 shows the negative 
correlation between education and poverty at the household level. 
 
Figure 4. Poverty Incidence by Education Level of Household Head 
 
Most importantly for the aim of this research, very few Mauritanian 
households have access to credit, and bank presence is almost exclusively 
restricted to urban areas. The EPCV includes questions designed to gauge 
household demand for credit during the 5 years prior to the survey. Figure 5 
shows the share of households that have applied for credit from a formal 
financial institution, as well as the share that had their requests approved. 
























just 5.6 percent, down from 8.8 percent in 2008. However, the likelihood of a 
successful credit application increased between the two surveys, rising from 
3.23 percent in 2008 to 4.45 percent in 2014. Credit applications are far more 
common, and credit approval is far more likely, among urban households as 
opposed to their rural counterparts (Figure 5). Physical access to banks is even 
more heavily skewed in favor of urban households, about a quarter of which 
have access to a bank, compared to just over 1 percent of rural households 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 5. Credit Demand by Area 
 




6. Analytical Framework 
A comprehensive understanding of household welfare requires an analysis of 
both income and consumption patterns. Income shocks do not always directly 
translate into decreased consumption or diminished welfare, and the 
mitigating factor may be thought of as household resilience. The ability to 
draw on past savings, to fall back on public assistance or to access credit to 
address temporary income shocks are all dimensions of resilience. Reflecting 
a long strand of literature (Note 12) on the importance of consumption rather 
than income as a primary indicator of household welfare, and taking into 
account the role of resilience, the analysis considers the following welfare 
indicators: (i) consumption (Note 13) of household production,  particularly 
agricultural produce; (ii) total spending on nondurable goods, excluding food 
and education; (iii) food spending; (iv) education spending; and (v) a dummy 
variable representing household poverty status. 
The following equation defines the parameters of interest: 
Υi =    α∁i   +    ∑ δv
V
v=1 Χv,i    +    μi   +    εi.                    (1) 
Where  Υ𝑖  is a dependent variable indexed to i (household) and ∁𝑖 is the 
dummy variable indicating whether the household has accessed credit from a 
formal financial institution in the five years preceding the interview. In 
addition, Χ𝑣,𝑖 represents a set of 𝑉 = 14 households characteristics, including 
the number of male adults in the household, number of children, total 
household size, amount of land owned, and dummy variables for urban or 
rural location, gender, age and education level of the household head. Area-
level fixed effects by province (moughata) are represented by 𝜇𝑖, and 𝜀𝑖 is an 
error term - which is allowed to be heteroskedastic in the analysis. Standard 




6.1 Endogeneity of Access to Credit 
The estimation of (1) is most likely affected by the endogeneity of access to 
credit. This may be due to a number of factors, including: (i) unobserved area-
level fixed effects that influence both demand for credit and household 
income and consumption, such as local prices, infrastructure quality, cultural 
norms, environmental conditions and natural-disaster risks; and (ii) 
unmeasured household characteristics that affect both demand for credit and 
household income and consumption, such as the health, ability, and fecundity 
of household members, as well as preference heterogeneity. (Note 15) An 
instrumental variable strategy (IV) based on the concept of the household 
isolation level (HIL) is used to address the endogeneity problem. The HIL 
(denoted by Ζ𝑖 in what follows) is computed by considering the average value 
of a household’s distance from vital infrastructure and facilities. These 
include the nearest water source, primary and secondary school, government 
offices, transportation services, healthcare facilities, mobile phone and 
internet services. Results are robust to alternative sets of variables considered 
to compute the HIL index. (Note 16) 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for this indicator, along with the 
various components which contribute to its definition. The first two columns 
report the mean (in meters) and the standard deviation from the full sample. 
The two central columns report these same statistics for households in urban 
areas, while households living in rural areas are considered in the last two 
columns of the table. 
The results show that the age, the education level of the household head as 
well as the household’s location (whether in an urban area or not) appear to 




successfully obtain credit tend to be less dependent on the consumption of 
household internal production and are more likely to invest in education. 
 







Variables Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Distance from water source 795.4248 1569.986 446.1524 1049.099 1228.571 1953.639 
Distance from transportation 
service 
1848.723 2421.069 827.8833 1462.304 3128.778 2573.088 
Distance from primary school 1353.707 1999.793 1060.65 1655.723 1721.311 2308.066 
Distance from secondary school 3420.595 2654.543 1837.693 2206.809 5403.926 1646.502 
Distance from healthcare 
facility 
3201.083 2644.932 2153.571 2340.462 4517.591 2404.349 
Distance from government 
office 
4034.412 2503.113 2905.743 2525.988 5454.604 1576.805 
Distance from mobile phone 
and internet service 
3911.923 2629.179 2552.726 2606.349 5615.555 1356.178 
 















6.2 Validity of the exclusion restriction 
 
The HIL index is regarded as a determinant for access to banks and other 
financial institutions. (Note 17) The location of household in rural and urban 
areas may follow from sorting along unobservable dimensions. Because of 
this, household isolation can be itself endogenous in our model, thus 
invalidating the exclusion restriction needed for identification. The 




netting off area unobservables and characteristics of the households living in 
those areas. 
To see this, the first stage equation is: 
∁i = βΖi+∑ γv
V
v=1 Χv,i + μi+ εi,                                                               (2) 
Which relates the dummy for access to credit to HIL controlling for the same 
variables already included in equation (1). The parameter 𝛽 is estimated from 
the residual variability of the instrument, 𝑍𝑖, after controlling for household 
characteristics and the area fixed effects. The extent of this variability in the 
data can be investigated by taking into account the residuals from the 
following equation: 
𝑍𝑖 = ∑ 𝜕𝑣
𝑉
𝑣=1 𝛸𝑣,𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,                                                                  (3) 
Residuals are plotted in Figure 7. The HIL index presents variability that is 
not fully explained by the control variables included in equation (2). Most 
importantly, it appears that also in rural areas households can be marginally 











The variability of residuals in equation (3) is a necessary condition for the 
identification, but does not make the exclusion restriction bulletproof. In an 
effort to address this problem, we turn to data from the 2008 EPCV and show 
that residuals in Figure 7 are not predicted by past area and household 
characteristics. This is shown in Figure 8, where access to credit is considered, 
along with a set of other variables, over the period 2003-2008. The lack of 
panel data on household across the two waves (2008 and 2014) forces the 
analysis at the area (moughata) level. We probe empirically the validity of 
instrument computing the estimation (Note 18) of the average value of 
residuals  𝐸𝑎
2014-in area-(Note 19) on the average value of the variables 
measured in 2008,  𝐸𝑎
2008. More in details, we consider the relationship 
between the residuals and a number of indicators, such as: educational 
indicators at different levels, the percentage of households located in urban 
areas, the average age of the household head, the percentage of households 
that had access to credit in 2008 and the average value of expenditure on non-
durable goods. 
The following equation is then estimated: 
𝐸𝑎
2014= 𝛼 +𝜌𝐸𝑎
2008+ 𝜀𝑎                                                                    (4) 
Table 2 reports the results related to the estimation of equation (4) and shows 
that the residuals in 2014 are orthogonal to the outcomes measured in 2008. 
The coefficients are equal to zero or not significant. In addition, Figure 8 
reports the scatterplot of these two variables, with a superimposed linear fit 
from the same regression. The figure offers little evidence of correlation with 
past characteristics, thus corroborating the exogeneity of the instrument used 




Table 2. Residuals in 2014 on Outcomes in 2008- OLS Estimate 
Variables Residuals-2014-moughata R-squared Obervations 








































Note. The treatment variables are the average value of the head age, the percentage 
households located in urban area; the percentage of household head educated at primay 
school, secondary school, traditional level and high school; the average value of non-durable 
expenditure; the percentage of households that have access to credit. All the variables are at 

































Table 3 and Table 4 provide a probit estimation of Equation 2. The analysis 
is clustered by moughata, and robust standard errors are reported throughout. 
The results show that HIL is negatively correlated with access to credit (Table 
3). The coefficients are statistically significant and economically meaningful, 
and the results are robust to the inclusion of the household characteristics 
(Table 4). The age and education level of the head of household and the 
household’s location in an urban area have especially positive and significant 
effects on the probability of accessing credit. Estimates of 𝛽 are presented 
along with standard errors, and statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 








Table 3. Probit Estimate of HIL and Access to Credit 
Variables Access to credit 





Note. The treatment variable is the household isolation level (HIL).Standard errors are 
clustered by moughata 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at 
the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 4. Probit Estimate of HIL and Access to Credit 
Variables Access to credit 
Household isolation level -0.0871*** 
 (0.0334) 
Land ownership -0.0671 
 (0.534) 




Number of males 0.0269 
 (0.0242) 
Age household -0.00169 
 (0.00336) 
Age head square -0.000359*** 
 (0.000135) 
Number of kids 0.00547 
 (0.0382) 
Head female -0.0164 
 (0.0757) 
Traditional ed. -0.00707 
 (0.114) 
Primary school 0.351** 
 (0.168) 
Secondary school 0.682*** 
 (0.139) 
Secondary tec-prof 0.877** 
 (0.381) 








Note. The treatment variable is the household isolation level (HIL). The independent 
variables are a dummy for urban location and for education level, household size, a dummy 
for female head of household, land ownership, number of adult males, number of children, 
age of household head, age of household head squared, average age of household members, 
and area-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by moughata. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at 




Table 5 and Table 6 present the reduced form (RF) estimates. They show that 
the HIL is positively correlated with the consumption of household 
production and poverty incidence and negatively correlated with education 
spending. These results are robust to the inclusion of all other household 
characteristics defined in the analysis. 
 











level 5.799*** -14.87*** -5.181 -6.512*** 
0.0308**
* 
 (0.938) (4.699) (4.067) (1,149) (0.00614) 
Constant 36.40*** 373.2*** 347.3*** 76.63*** 0.213*** 
 (0.00710) (0.0356) (0.0308) (0.00870) 
(4.65e-
05) 
      
Observations 9,472 9,472 9,472 9,472 9,472 
R-squared 0.063 0.161 0.085 0.067 0.112 
Note. The treatment variable is the household isolation level (HIL). Standard errors are clustered by moughata 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 6. Impact of HIL on Welfare-RF Estimates 
Variables Auto-consumption Non-durable-expenditure Food-expenditure Education-expenditure Poverty 
 
Household isolation level 3.915*** -3.920 1.408 -3.575*** 0.0161*** 
 (1.089) (4.654) (4.351) (0.767) (0.00463) 
Land ownership 45.23*** -48.83 6.172 -5.642 0.0248 
 (15.01) (31.08) (26.86) (23.65) (0.0436) 
Age head 1.240*** 0.291 1.455 2.665*** -0.00377* 
 (0.362) (1.080) (0.975) (0.390) (0.00193) 
Urban -19.91** 98.18*** 58.92*** 11.06*** -0.143*** 
 (8.702) (18.21) (15.54) (3.108) (0.0233) 
Number of males 0.727 -0.586 -0.419 0.676 0.0112*** 
 (0.700) (1.862) (1.485) (0.738) (0.00398) 
Age household 0.108 1.324*** 1.229*** -1.872*** -0.000933 
 (0.148) (0.419) (0.448) (0.159) (0.000989) 
Age head square -0.0112*** -0.00898 -0.0183** -0.0175*** 3.71e-05** 
 (0.00340) (0.00899) (0.00789) (0.00313) (1.75e-05) 
Number of kids -3.219** -4.338 -7.833*** -21.59*** 0.0292*** 
 (1.492) (2.684) (2.614) (1.520) (0.00686) 
Head Female -4.574 2.849 0.353 10.61*** 0.00822 
 (3.771) (5.655) (5.858) (2.021) (0.00960) 
Traditional ed. 2.678 15.27* 13.04 4.266 -0.0109 
 (4.194) (8.769) (8.699) (2.769) (0.0159) 
Primary school -0.580 28.92** 19.66 20.73*** -0.0346* 
 (4.902) (13.66) (13.19) (3.055) (0.0191) 
Secondary school -0.778 66.63*** 39.44*** 25.06*** -0.0851*** 
 (4.788) (12.91) (12.23) (4.060) (0.0186) 
Secondary tec-prof -6.677 117.9** 61.93 21.35*** -0.103*** 
 (13.35) (57.05) (44.67) (5.134) (0.0335) 
High school 1.597 99.94*** 53.16** 41.78*** -0.114*** 
 (8.110) (30.46) (25.83) (5.373) (0.0224) 
Size -0.0486 -10.55*** -9.144*** 11.91*** 0.0383*** 
 (0.496) (1.716) (1.732) (0.714) (0.00600) 
Constant 13.38 334.3*** 302.0*** -34.00*** 0.155*** 
 (11.82) (31.72) (30.31) (7.054) (0.0499)       
Observations 9,472 9,472 9,472 9,472 9,472 




Note. (refers to Table 6, previous page). The treatment variable is the household isolation level (HIL). 
The independent variables are a dummy for urban location and for education level, household size, a 
dummy for female head of household, land ownership, number of adult males, number of children, 
age of household head, age of household head squared, average age of household members, and area-
level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by moughata. 





Table 7 and Table 8 present Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates of the 
relationship between access to credit and the key variables used in the 
analysis. Estimates of 𝛼 are reported along with standard errors, and statistical 
significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels is noted. 
 
 
Table 7. Impact of Access to Credit on Welfare - Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
Variables Auto-consumption Non-durable-expenditure Food-expenditure Education-expenditure Poverty 
 
Access to credit -522.2** 1,349* 474.7 586.9*** -2.795** 
 (212.5) (752.0) (446.6) (225.0) (1.329) 
Constant 51.13*** 377.7*** 387.4*** 44.45*** 0.270*** 
 (3.184) (11.27) (6.691) (3.371) (0.0199)       
Observations 9,455 9,455 9,455 9,455 9,455 
Note. The treatment variable is the access to credit. The instrument used is HIL. Standard errors are 
clustered by moughata. 




















Access to credit -506.4* 524.4 -168.2 464.0** -2.116 
 (264.3) (725.2) (540.5) (230.7) (1.421) 
Land ownership 51.40** -55.12 8.301 -11.31 0.0506 
 (20.87) (35.15) (26.26) (29.10) (0.0500) 
Age head 2.608*** -1.186 1.856 1.419 0.00206 
 (1.011) (2.337) (1.807) (0.998) (0.00496) 
Urban -12.72 90.44*** 61.06*** 4.458 -0.112*** 
 (11.16) (24.79) (20.13) (4.652) (0.0336) 
Number of males 1.756 -1.715 -0.121 -0.276 0.0155** 
 (1.555) (3.177) (1.967) (1.322) (0.00710) 
Age household 0.0387 1.381*** 1.197*** -1.809*** -0.00121 
 (0.191) (0.446) (0.461) (0.182) (0.00118) 
Age head square -0.0228** 0.00364 -0.0217 -0.00694 -1.26e-05 
 (0.00901) (0.0192) (0.0150) (0.00874) (4.27e-05) 
Number of kids -2.514 -5.113* -7.661*** -22.28*** 0.0319*** 
 (2.050) (2.891) (2.868) (1.975) (0.00881) 
Head female -6.306 4.525 -0.329 12.05*** 0.00117 
 (5.264) (6.982) (5.831) (3.978) (0.0178) 
Traditional ed. -0.826 19.00* 11.94 7.399 -0.0258 
 (6.471) (10.36) (8.975) (5.114) (0.0238) 
Primary school 9.074 19.36 23.18 11.74 0.00554 
 (9.644) (20.88) (18.31) (7.987) (0.0432) 
Secondary school 34.19* 30.52 51.15 -7.154 0.0613 
 (20.11) (54.55) (41.67) (18.79) (0.108) 
Secondary tec-prof 48.00 61.21 80.14 -28.89 0.125 
 (54.49) (110.8) (85.59) (46.78) (0.248) 
High school 87.59** 10.85 82.01 -36.62 0.244 
 (44.39) (123.2) (95.78) (37.26) (0.238) 
Size -0.437 -10.14*** -9.256*** 12.28*** 0.0367*** 
 (0.806) (2.169) (1.721) (0.864) (0.00766) 
Constant -13.80 443.7*** 376.4*** -22.14 -0.0386 
 (24.45) (53.02) (45.73) (22.29) (0.103)       
Observations 9,455 9,455 9,455 9,455 9,455 
Note. The treatment variable is the access to credit. The instrument used is HIL. The independent 
variables are a dummy for urban location and for education level, household size, a dummy for female 
head of household, land ownership, number of adult males, number of children, age of household 
head, age of household head squared, average age of household members, and area-level fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by moughata. 







Table 7 indicates a strong negative correlation between access to credit and 
both consumption of household production and poverty incidence, as well as 
a similarly strong positive correlation with spending on non-durable goods 
and services and education. Table 8 presents IV estimates for the same 
outcomes broken down by household characteristics, which underscores the 
negative correlation with consumption of household production and the 
positive correlation with education spending. Food spending is not 
significantly higher among households with access to finance, which is likely 
due to the relative inelasticity of food spending in general. Also, results 
highlight a positive but not significant effect of access to credit on poverty 
reduction as well as on non-durable expenditure. 
In addition table 8 presents the Instrumental Variable estimation of access to 
credit on welfare also vis-à-vis a number of household-level variables. 
Consumption of household production correlates with land size, almost 
certainly reflecting a focus on agriculture. Spending on non-durable goods 
and services and food spending are both higher among urban households, 
while poverty incidence is lower. Education spending tends to be higher 
among female-headed households. All expenditure variables decrease as the 
number of children increases. 
8. Conclusions 
The first-degree analysis of the relationship between access to credit and 
household welfare in Mauritania presented above yields a number of insights 
with potential policy applications. The analysis begins by confirming the 
intuitive conclusion that household isolation is negatively correlated with 
access to credit. The related coefficients are statistically significant and 
economically meaningful, even when controlling for other household 




provide a strong econometric framework - for the first time- to investigate the 
linkage between welfare and finance access in Mauritania. The choice of a 
variable related to spatial distance (and, in particular, used as an instrumental 
variable) represents an innovation in the access to credit literature. 
Interestingly, after controlling for endogeneity, the paper also finds no 
significant effects of access to credit on the actual poverty rate nor on non-
durable goods consumption. 
The analysis also finds that the age and education level of the head of 
household and the household’s location in an urban area appear to be 
significant determinants of credit access. This is particularly relevant in the 
Mauritanian context, where urbanization rates have vastly outpaced 
improvements in education indicators. The substantive significance of the 
coefficients appears to reflect quite clearly some of the characteristics of the 
educational system in the country: as of 2015 only 24 percent of children were 
enrolled in a secondary school, and only 5.6 percent in tertiary. Were any 
further argument required in favor of strengthening the coverage and the 
quality of education in Mauritania, these findings provide statistical evidence 
that greater educational attainment appears to positively affect access to 
credit. In fact, some of the strongest correlations with welfare are identified 
by this paper with the levels of education, and in particular it appears clear 
that individuals with secondary and high school education enjoy better 
conditions vis-à-vis non-durable and food expenditure and are less poor 
(Figure 4). 
Moreover, households that successfully obtain credit tend to be less 
dependent on the consumption of household production and are more likely 
to invest in education. The former implies higher living standards, greater 




latter, meanwhile, suggests a special preference for investment in human 
capital, which may be a cause, effect or corollary of a household-level 
predisposition toward other forms of economic investment. 
Finally, the results of this analysis present cause for Mauritanian policy 
makers to consider strategies for expanding financial infrastructure in 
underserved rural areas. Provided that progress is achieved in the viability and 
solvency ratios of the sector (namely by concretely addressing the issues of 
operational risks, access to reliable credit information, capacity, and poor 
supervision) an improvement of access to financial services and microcredit 
programs beyond the country’s urban centers may increase inclusion by 
facilitating rural households’ chances of obtaining credit. At present, a 
household’s location in an urban area appears to have a differential impact on 
credit access, even controlling for other factors. Recent advances in mobile 
banking technology are already expanding access to finance in underserved 
areas throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, infrastructure 
investment and regulatory reforms designed to encourage the development of 
financial services in rural areas, particularly combined with efforts to enhance 
educational service, could spur productivity growth and support welfare 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
A large body of literature has examined the relationship between natural 
resources, economic growth, and income inequality, revealing a set of 
complex and often ambiguous associations.  
The relationship between natural resources and economic growth is especially 
controversial. On the one hand, general economic theory suggests that a 
booming natural resource sector will boost economic growth, and that it will 
facilitate—though not necessarily cause—improvements in poverty and 
shared-prosperity indicators. Ideally, rising natural resource output would 
increase public revenues, enabling greater public investment in physical and 
human capital, while the private returns to resource production would 
encourage greater private investment (both domestic and external), as well as 
higher rates of household savings. On the other hand, the substantial literature 
on the so-called “Dutch disease” finds that a resources boom can divert 
resources away from the non-resource tradable sectors (especially 
manufacturing), distort the growth of non-tradables (especially services), and 
put upward pressure on the exchange rate. These effects erode the 
competitiveness of exports and give imports an advantage over domestic 
production, undermining long-term growth (Sachs and Warner 1999). More 
recently,  Brahmbhatt, Canuto, and Vostroknutova (2010) suggest that when 
natural resource-related production increases, the effects on welfare (regarded 
here as improvement in national income) will depend on whether the 
declining sectors have some special features that could be instrumental for 
long-term growth and welfare, such as increasing returns to scale or positive 
technological spillovers. They also emphasize the effect that fiscal policy can 
have on mitigating the negative impacts of the Dutch disease, and may play 




increase long-lasting and by adopting counter-cyclical stances to offset 
inflationary pushes and avoid looping into stop-and-go growth patterns. This 
is particularly important in low-income countries, where the portion of the 
newly discovered wealth is more substantial.  
As for the relationship between income inequality and natural resources the 
first contributes dates back to Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990) who find 
that mineral resource endowments, rather than other variables such as GDP, 
are an important determinant of the income distribution. More recently, 
Lopez-Feldman et al. (2006) find that an increase in income due to the 
extraction of natural resources alleviates inequality through a reduction of the 
Gini coefficient. Barbier (2014) argues that understanding the depletion of 
natural capital is crucial to assessing both the extent to which natural capital 
will contribute to future economic growth and the pace at which inequality 
has increased over time. According to Barbier (2015), environmental 
degradation and the widening gap between the world’s rich and poor are 
symptomatic of gradually intensifying structural imbalances in how natural 
capital is used to create economic wealth and how that wealth is distributed. 
On the one hand, ecological capital is hard to estimate and tends to be 
undervalued, especially the valuation of ecosystem services (Barbier, 2013), 
and thus overexploited. On the other hand, the human capital stock is 
insufficient to meet demand, which drives rising income inequality. This 
structural imbalance between natural and human capital creates obstacles to 
innovation, growth and prosperity. Behzadan et al. (2017)  highlights the 
direct connection between the inequality in the distribution of resource rents 
and the severity of the impact of the Dutch disease. The more resource rents 
are broadly distributed, the less marked the effects of the Dutch disease are. 




or favorable can the exploitation of new natural resources for an economy. 
Fum and Hodler (2010) focus on the political-economy aspects of resource 
management and income inequality. They present empirical evidence that 
ethnic polarization increases the probability that a large stock of natural 
resources will correlate with inequality.  
A different and interesting perspective on the issue of natural resources (from 
the angle of trade) and growth is offered by Furtado (1954), who focused on 
the nexus between economic development and price levels. Like for 
structuralists in general, he regards inflation as the result of ill-distributed 
growth coupled with adjustments in the demand by countries with sticky 
money prices and rigid supply structures. In essence, this refers to a change 
in relative prices that turns into inflation on account of whether (or to what 
extent) the relevant socio-economic agents are able to maintain their portion 
of output (also referred as to “social conflict inflation”). In other words, a 
change in relative prices was assumed to be triggered by the gap between the 
increases in income and the ability to import, as in the Latin American case 
postulated by Furtado. 
Although many empirical studies have investigated the link between natural 
capital, growth and inequality, very limited research is available on how all 
three factors interact. Moreover, much of the existing literature on the subject 
fails to adequately account for the role of wealth stocks. A thorough review 
of the literature would seem to indicate that the quantitative relationship 
between the exploitation of natural resources, economic growth and income 
inequality has been studied only by Gylfason and Zoega (2002) and 
Alessandrini and Buccellato (2009). Behzadan et al. (2017) recently furthered 
the understanding of the effects that an equitable – or less – distribution of 




find that an unequal distribution in the rents of natural resources leads to more 
acute cases of Dutch disease. 
This study aims to tests the existence of a relationship between the 
dependence on nonrenewable natural resources (hereafter dependence), GDP 
per capita (GDPc) and income inequality. The analysis is conducted in the 
spirit of Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001) and uses panel data for 43 countries 
for which data is available from 1980 to 2012. The final objective is to test a 
system of two equations in which the dependent variables are per capita GDP 
and the Gini index and the independent variable is the dependence on 
nonrenewable natural resources. While Gylfason and Zoega (2002) and 
Alessandrini and Buccellato (2009) also used cross-sectional data, this 
analysis innovates on the existing literature by controlling for the presence of 
unobserved time invariant country heterogeneity, exploiting the data panel. 
The empirical results from the baseline model provide evidence of a negative 
association between resource dependence and GDP per capita, which is 
consistent with the existing literature on the Dutch disease effect.  
However, considering that previous studies show that Dutch disease is not 
consistent or inevitable – as it is influenced by the institutional heterogeneity 
across countries (Bunte 2011) –, we replicate the analysis to account for the 
heterogeneity of country income groups. In fact, the intensity of Dutch disease 
effects depends in large part on whether and how natural resource revenues 
are used to promote social equity through investment in human capital, public 
goods and services, and targeted poverty-reduction programs. This study tests 
weather countries ‘structural characteristics – captured by the differences in 
the income levels – influence the empirical relationship between 




findings show that among higher-income countries a greater degree of 
resource dependence is associated with an improvement in the income 
distribution and has no statistically significant correlation with economic 
growth. Conversely, greater resource dependence among lower-income 
countries is associated with a lower GDP per capita even if the association 
with income inequality suggests an equalizing effect (on average)9. 
These findings imply that the relationship between natural resource 
dependence and economic growth and income inequality hinges on a given 
country’s income level. Replicating the analysis on a subsample of resource-
rich countries confirms the robustness of these findings. These findings 
further support the idea that the “resource curse” is not caused by natural 
resource endowments per se, but rather by country-level characteristics (see, 
e.g. Gylfason, 2001; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006). Under specific 
circumstances, the availability of natural resources could be a blessing given 
the equalizing effect on income distribution. Research by Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2008) suggest that resource-abundant countries do not systematically 
end up being worse off than resource-poor countries in the long-run, and hint 
at the existence of significant, direct and indirect, links between country 
characteristics – particularly the quality of institutions – and economic 
outcomes. 
Following this introductory section, the paper is structured as follows: the 
second section describes the study’s methodology and clarifies the empirical 
strategy for obtaining consistent parameter estimates under the specific 
assumptions imposed on the model; the third section discusses the dataset 
                                                          
9 The sign of the coefficient also suggests that once dependence reaches a certain level the 




constructed for this analysis and provides some descriptive statistics; the 
fourth section presents the results of the analysis; and the last section draws 
policy implications and conclusions. 
Methodology 
This study uses a broad set of specifications and estimation techniques to 
explore the relationship between nonrenewable resource dependence and 
income inequality and economic growth. As the observed results are 
comparable with previous studies, it is necessary to add further controls and 
assumptions to the model. Moreover, adding further controls and altering 
certain assumptions enables a more comprehensive evaluation of the overall 
robustness of the results and enriches the analysis by considering changes in 
magnitude and the significance of the estimated coefficients on the dependent 
variable.  
The baseline model is a system of two equations that does not take into 
account the heterogeneity among groups of countries. The recursive model is 
based on the existing literature but innovates it, by exploiting the panel 
structure of the database to control for the presence of unobservable country-
level heterogeneity, as in Equation 1: 
Equation 1: Model Specification 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝑁𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡   + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎𝑖  + 𝑢1 𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽3  +  𝛽4𝑁𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡   +  𝛽5𝑌𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑎𝑖  + 𝑢2  𝑖,𝑡
 
 
where the two dependent variables are the country’s GINI index and its GDP 
per capita, NKD is its nonrenewable resources dependence index, X and Y 
are two vectors of control variables, 𝑎𝑖 represents the country time invariant 




that the error terms in the two equations are not correlated, each equation is 
firstly estimated separately using a fixed-effect estimator (FE).10 However, 
relaxing this assumption, we have also allowed for a correlation among the 
equation’s error terms through a simultaneous estimate of the two equations 
via a seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE) that is expected to 
increase the efficiency of the results.  
The same estimation procedure is applied to all the model specifications, and 
for the sake of brevity, each equation is not formalized. The second model 
specification accounts for heterogeneity related to country income group by 
adding a dummy variable to each equation that identifies lower-income 
countries. The interaction of this variable with the nonrenewable resource 
dependence index allows to distinguish between the empirical associations in 
lower and higher-income countries. Finally, a third model specification is 
restricted to a subsample of non-renewable resources rich countries.  
Data 
The dataset comprises 43 countries from five continents and covers the period 
from 1980 to 2012. It includes all countries for which complete data on 
nonrenewable resources are available and nonzero. Using the World Bank 
classification system, the information contained in the dataset can be divided 
into four groups, as shown in Table 1: 13 high-income countries, 14 upper-
middle-income countries, 12 lower-middle-income countries and 4 low-
income countries. Figure 2 illustrates the geographic coverage of the dataset. 
The countries included on our dataset are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, 
                                                          
10 The presence of unobserved country heterogeneity has been tested using a Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test for random effects, while the Hausman test has enabled the use of a 




Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Gabon, 
Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
Table 1: Countries classified by Income Groups 
Income group Frequency: Absolute Relative Cumulative 
High income: OECD 13 30% 30% 
Upper middle income 14 33% 63% 
Lower middle income 12 28% 91% 
Low income 4 9% 100% 
Total 43 100%  
 





Assessing the natural capital available in a country is a complex but necessary 
task. According to Dasgupta (2010 and 2014) the GDP per capita and other 
macroeconomic aggregates  (such as private consumption, as well as 
indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI)) should not be 
regarded as comprehensive or objective indicators of economic and social 
welfare. In fact, they do not reflect the depletion of the natural capital stock, 
and that more sophisticated forms of wealth accounting that include produced, 
human and natural capital are more appropriate measures of inclusive and 
sustainable development. The World Bank has long been a major advocate 
for integrating the sustainable management of natural capital into growth 
strategies. The institution has built a dataset on national wealth that is our 
source for historical data on natural capital. The dataset disaggregates the 
three components of national wealth—produced capital, intangible capital 
and natural capital—and it decomposes the natural wealth stock into 
renewable and nonrenewable resources.  
This analysis focuses on nonrenewable resources due to the methodological 
soundness of their estimation.11 Current techniques for estimating the stock 
of renewable resources are limited, and their core methodological 
assumptions may compromise the reliability of the data. The literature uses 
two different methods for defining the economic importance of nonrenewable 
resources: “resource abundance,” which is the per capita value of the stock of 
nonrenewable resources, and “resource dependence,” which is the value of 
nonrenewable resources as a share of total national wealth. As noted by 
Gylfason and Zoega (2002), resource dependence is a measure of the current 
                                                          
11 Although criticism was expressed (see among others  van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 
(2009)) about the World Bank natural wealth dataset, the assessment of non-renewable 
natural resource wealth requires a lower number of assumptions relatively to the 




economic relevance of natural resources, while resource abundance reflects 
the estimated value of the natural resource stock.  
Examining the distribution of resource dependence and abundance across 
countries at different stages of development reveals that the two measures do 
not evolve according to the same pattern.  
 shows that average resource dependence is least prevalent among high-
income countries (2.1 percent), most prevalent among upper-middle-income 
countries (15.1 percent) and moderate among both lower-middle-income 
countries (8.3 percent) and low-income countries (10.8 percent). Meanwhile, 
resource abundance is also most prevalent among upper-middle-income 
countries but is more common among high-income countries than it is among 
lower-middle-income and low-income countries. This is likely due to high-
income countries having larger stocks of produced and intangible capital, 
which offset the economic importance of natural resources. This analysis 
focuses on resource dependence rather than resource abundance, as the former 




Table 2: Average nonrenewable resource dependence and abundance by income 
group (1980-2012) 
  Dependence  Log_Abundance 
High income 2% 7.8 
Upper middle income 15% 8.6 
Lower middle income 8% 7.3 
Low income 11% 6.6 
 
The data on income inequality is sourced from the World Bank’s “All-the-
Ginis Database,” which was last updated in 2014.12 The database collects Gini 
indexes from multiple sources into long time series. The data has been 
standardized for this analysis via the so-called “choice-by-precedence 
approach,” which reflects each dataset’s reliability, degree of variable 
standardization, and consistency of geographical coverage. GDP and 
population figures have been collected from the United Nation’s UNCTAD-
STAT database. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for per capita GDP 
and the Gini index by country income group. The Gini index peaks among 
the upper-middle-income group, falls among the lower-middle-income and 
low-income groups and is lowest among the high-income group. These data 
are consistent with the relationship between inequality and GDP described by 
Kuznets (1955). 
                                                          





Table 3: GDP per capita and Gini index by income group (1980-2012) 
 GDP per capita 
(US$ thous) 
Gini index 
High income 34.5 33.9 
Upper middle income 8.4 49.1 
Lower middle income 2.8 40.5 
Low income 1.4 42.7 
 
 
The data for control variables was collected from different sources. Data on 
the structural and cyclical characteristics of national economies comes from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicator Database13 and UNCTAD-
STAT;14 the figures on education are sourced from Barro & Lee (2013);15 
those on the real effective exchange rate (REER) are taken from Darvas 
(2012);16 and metal- and oil-price figures are sourced from the IMF’s Primary 
Commodity Prices database.17 Referring to the original datasets will provide 
further details on the methodology and sources used. Table 4 shows income-
level-related heterogeneity across countries for the specified variables.  
 
                                                          
13 Available at http://data.worldbank.org  
14 Available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org  
15 Available at http://www.barrolee.com  
16 Available at http://bruegel.org  




Table 4. Indicators of heterogeneity across countries  






added (% of GDP 
at market prices) 
Manufacturing 
value added (% 
GDP at m. prices) 
Agriculture value 
added (% of GDP 
at m. prices) 
High income 4.6 80.9 66.3 17.6 3.9 
Upper middle 
income 
0.9 65.3 52.3 17.1 7.9 
Lower middle 
income 
0.7 75.7 48.5 18.6 18.1 
Low income 0.4 63.7 45.4 14.6 29.4 
Average 1.9 73.2 54.8 17.4 11.5 
 








11.7 11.8 4.5 73.0 91.9 
9.7 9.9 4.6 73.0 91.9 
9.4 9.4 4.7 73.0 91.9 
6.7 7.4 4.8 73.0 91.9 
9.9 10.1 4.6 73.0 91.9 
                                                          
18 Education ratio is the ratio between the share of the population with secondary 






Finally, to introduce the empirical analysis Table 5 summarizes the pairwise 
correlations between the most relevant variables. As shown in the table, 
resource dependence is positively associated with the Gini index and 
negatively associated with GDP per capita at a significance level greater than 
1 percent. In other words, the simple correlations show that the more 
dependent a country is on nonrenewable resources, the higher its Gini 
coefficient and the lower its GDP per capita. 
Table 5: Correlation matrix for the main variables 
 Resource 
Dependence 
Gini index Log GDP 
Resource Dependence 1   
Gini index  0.242*** 1  




This section summarizes the results of the analytical methodology described 
above. The specifications and the estimation techniques have been 
systematically adapted according to the different assumptions characterizing 
each model. The baseline model estimates the average empirical associations 
for all the countries included in the dataset, and is then adjusted to assess 




on a sub-sample of resource-rich countries19, with a view to test the robustness 
of the empirical association. 
The Baseline Model: Pooling All Countries 
Table 6 presents the results from the baseline model. The two equations have 
been estimated separately using a fixed-effect estimator and simultaneously 
using SURE plus country-level dummy variables. We find that, on average, 
nonrenewable resource dependence is negatively associated with both income 
inequality and GDP per capita. In the simultaneous estimation both 
coefficients increased because of the correlation between the error terms of 
the two equations.  
                                                          




Table 6: Estimated results from the baseline model specification  











High-low education ratio -
0.639*** 
- -0.203 - 
High-low education ratio square 0.021*** - 0.010** - 
Consumer price index (2005) -0.001 - 0.002 - 
Services value added share 0.078* - 0.071 - 
Manufacturing value added share -0.047 - 0.069 - 
Agriculture value added share -0.091* - -0.112** - 
Log labor force - -7.916*** - -17.991*** 
Log gross fixed capital formation - 3.802*** - 7.472*** 
Log exports of goods and services - 2.422** - 3.422*** 
Log REER - 5.082*** - 1.353 
World oil price index - 0.067*** - 0.067*** 
World Metal price index - 0.013 - 0.006 
Observations 1015 1034 873 873 
R2 0.058 0.383 0.910 0.858 
Note: * ** and *** denote significance at the 10% 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Overall, these results indicate that a positive variation in the dependencies is 




the Gini index. In other words, resource dependence is associated with lower 
levels of GDP per capita, but also with lower income inequality. These results 
are consistent with the literature on Dutch disease, which explains them as an 
effect of the diversion of labor and capital from the industrial sector to the 
natural resource sector, combined with the negative effect of real exchange-
rate appreciation on the tradable sector. However, the model’s findings 
suggest that, on average, the inter-sectoral shift in labor patterns—which 
affects the distribution of income through rising wage differentials between 
sectors—is offset by the investment of additional fiscal revenue in pro-poor 
policy interventions. The literature highlights that the sign of the relationship 
between resource dependence and inequality is likely to depend on each 
country’s institutional framework and the quality of its policy interventions. 
These factors determine whether—and how—natural resource revenues 
support rising productivity and consumption among lower-income 
households. The full-sample findings suggest that, policies designed to 
promote shared prosperity more than offset the increase in inequality caused 
by the inter-sectoral wage differential.  
However, pooling such a heterogeneous mix of countries may undermine the 
reliability of the model’s conclusions. The next section explores the issue of 
country-level heterogeneity by adding dummy variables to the baseline 
specification. The objective is to disentangle the influence of specific 
countries or groups of countries by disaggregating the dataset based on a 
likely explanatory variable, which in this case is country income level. 
Controlling for Heterogeneity between Income Groups  
The model specification presented below attempts to differentiate the impact 




has been adjusted to include a dummy variable equal to 1 for low- and lower-
middle-income countries and to 0 for high- and upper-middle-income 
countries. Within this framework, the coefficient associated with the 
interaction variable will measure the association between resource 
dependence, GDP per capita and the Gini index among lower-income 
countries, while the coefficient associated with the non-interaction variables 
permits to isolate the average relationship for higher-income countries. Table 
7 summarizes the results obtained from both the sequential and the 

















Table 7: Estimated results  accounting for income-group heterogeneity 
 Fixed Effect SURE 
 Gini index  GDPc Gini index  GDPc 
Nonrenewable resource dependence -0.082*** -0.006 -0.190*** 0.124 
Lower income dropped dropped 4.386* 47.628*** 
Lower income* Nonrenewable resource dependence 0.068 -0.370*** 0.115** -0.720*** 
High-low education ratio -0.622*** - -0.179 - 
High-low education ratio square 0.021*** - 0.010** - 
Consumer price index (2005) -0.002 - 0.000 - 
Services value added share 0.081* - 0.071 - 
Manufacturing value added share -0.043 - 0.068 - 
Agriculture value added share -0.087 - -0.110** - 
Log labor force 
- -6.538** - 
-
17.058*** 
Log gross fixed capital formation - 3.433*** - 7.237*** 
Log exports of goods and services - 2.348** - 3.519*** 
Log REER - 5.852*** - 2.742 
World oil price index - 0.068*** - 0.066*** 
World metal price index - 0.016 - 0.010 
Observations 1015 1034 873 873 
R2 0.060 0.392 0.911 0.863 
Note: * ** and *** denote significance at the 10% 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The results show that higher levels of resource dependence are associated 
with lower levels of income inequality among countries in the higher-income 
group. However, the association with the GDP per capita is not statistically 
different from zero for this group of countries. These findings are confirmed 
in both the fixed effect and the seemingly unrelated regression models. 




system of equations the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly larger 
than in the other case. 
The association within the lower income group shows a different picture. As 
for the income inequality equation, the estimated coefficient associated with 
the interaction term is not statistically different from zero using a fixed effect 
estimator, thus suggesting no association between income inequality and 
resource dependence. However, the sign turns to be positive and statistically 
different from zero when the system equations are estimated simultaneously 
(SURE estimator). The average association in this case is given by the 
difference between the coefficient of the interaction terms and the coefficient 
of not interacted dependence. The net effect (-0.190+0.115=- 0.075) is still 
inequality-reducing although to a lesser degree.   Conversely, the coefficients 
estimated in the GDP equations show that a greater dependence is always 
associated with a lower level of GDP per capita, regardless of the estimation 
technique. All in all, the heterogeneity between country income groups allows 
to disentangle and clarify the results obtained in the pooled baseline models. 
From a methodological perspective, this heterogeneity affirms the importance 
of considering structural differences between countries at different stages of 
development. From a macroeconomic perspective, it lends credibility to the 
idea that the impact of natural resource dependence on income and inequality 
is a function of country-specific structural characteristics rather than an 
ineluctable curse.  Within the higher income countries, the dependence from 
nonrenewable resources could be even a blessing since it resulted to be 




Analyzing a Subsample of Resource-Rich Countries  
The model presented below focuses on a subset of countries defined as 
nonrenewable resource rich according to the IMF’s 2013 Resource 
Governance Index Report.20 The full sample included countries in which 
nonrenewable natural resources played a relatively modest economic role. 
Excluding these countries can shed light on the possibility that the empirical 
associations between resource dependence and the Gini index and GDP per 
capita are affected by the relative economic importance of natural resources. 
Furthermore, focusing on a subsample of resource-rich countries also tests the 
robustness of the estimated relationships by reducing the original sample by 
one-third21. Table 8 summarizes the subsample’s composition by income 
group of the resulting restricted panel.  
Table 8: Countries included in resource-rich sub-group, classified by income groups 
 Absolute Relative 
High income 5 16.7% 
Upper middle income 11 36.7% 
Lower middle income 10 33.3% 
Low income 4 13.3% 
Total 30 100% 
 
                                                          
20 Available at http://www.resourcegovernance.org/resource-governance-
index/report  
21 Based on the IMF classification of resource-rich countries (see note 16), thirteen 
countries are dropped from our original dataset: Argentina, Bulgaria, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Spain, Thailand, 





According to the IMF report, “nations [rich in nonrenewable natural 
resources] produce 85% of the world’s petroleum, 90% of its diamonds and 
80% of its copper, generating trillions of dollars in annual profits.”  
Table 9 summarizes the empirical results of the model estimated for the 
subsample of resource-rich countries. The figures confirm the results of the 
full-sample model.  The association between dependence and income 
inequality is negative for both the higher and lower income group) even if to 
a lesser degree (-0.177+0.129=0.048). As for the association with the GDP, 
we find no association in the higher income economies and a strong negative 
association in lower income countries. In other words, the subsample analysis 
confirms the robustness of the full-sample results. The magnitude of the 
coefficient, as expected, slightly increases relative to the full-sample model, 
but the sign of the associations and their economic implications remain 
unchanged. Restricting the analysis to resource-rich countries supports the 
conclusion that the impact of resource dependence on income inequality and 
economic growth depends on country-level characteristics. The following 





Table 9. Estimated results from the resource-rich subsample 








-0.067** 0.008 -0.177*** 0.122 
Lower Income dropped dropped 6.090** 57.336*** 
Lower income * Nonrenewable 
resource Dependence 
0.078 -0.362*** 0.129** -0.756*** 
High-Low education ratio -0.418*** - -0.159 - 
High-Low education ratio square 0.015*** - 0.008* - 
Consumer Price Index (2005) -0.010* - -0.003 - 
Services value added share 0.130*** - 0.117** - 
Manufacturing value added share -0.006 - 0.064 - 
Agriculture value added share -0.175*** - -0.154** - 
Log Labour Force 
- -8.651*** - 
-
26.131*** 
Log Gross fixed capital formation - 0.975 - 5.280*** 
Log Exports of goods and services - 2.663** - 6.042*** 
Log REER - 5.057*** - 3.325 
World Oil price index - 0.081*** - 0.091*** 
World Metal price index - 0.018 - -0.001 
Observations 667 707 580 580 
R2 0.096 0.311 0.911 0.864 
Note: * ** and *** denote significance at the 10% 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Conclusions 
This study was designed to investigate the empirical relationships between 
dependence on nonrenewable natural resources and income inequality and the 
GDP per capita. Innovating on the previous literature, it takes advantage on a 




GDP per capita, income inequality (Gini index) and a bundle of control 
variables for 43 countries from five continents and covering the period from 
1980 to 2012.  Exploiting this panel, we estimated the two equations in the 
model either separately or simultaneously. The simultaneous estimation 
technique (SURE) allowed us to take into account the potential correlation 
among the error terms of the two-equation model. 
The results of the baseline specification showed that an increase in resource 
dependence is associated with lower GDP per capita but a more equal income 
distribution. A subsequent specification addresses the problem of 
heterogeneity between countries at different income levels, since the 
descriptive statistics clearly pointed to substantial variations between country 
income groups. Controlling for the heterogeneity between higher-and lower-
income countries reveals dramatically different empirical associations for 
each of these two groups. Among higher-income countries, resource 
dependence is associated with lower levels of income inequality while the 
association with the GDP per capita is not statistically different from zero. 
However, among lower-income countries greater resource dependence is 
associated lower per capita GDP and greater income inequality.  
A third specification restricted the analysis to a subsample of resource-rich 
countries, which included about two-thirds of the countries included in the 
original full sample. The objective of this third specification was to increase 
the robustness of the findings by excluding the countries with lower 
endowment in non-renewable capital. The results largely corroborate those 
from the full-sample analysis. These findings further support the idea that 





Taken together, these findings point to a number of important policy 
implications. While resource dependence initially appears to correlate with 
lower per capita income, this association is nullified among high-income 
countries. One prospective explanation for this finding is that wealthier 
countries are systematically more likely to manage resource revenues 
effectively, and that they are more capable of mitigating their exposure to the 
inherent multidimensional volatility of the resource sector.  By contrast, 
poorer countries are more likely to experience boom-and-bust economic 
cycles driven by unmediated external shocks and pro-cyclical expenditure 
policies, and due to weaker public financial and administrative systems, they 
may be less able to use resource revenues to promote broad-based 
improvements in productivity. These findings appear to confirm the results of 
previous analyses and literature, and they further underscore the importance 
of both reinforcing macroeconomic resilience and investing resource 
revenues in physical and human capital in order to facilitate the growth of the 
non-resource economy. However, in the absence of a comprehensive dataset 
providing systematic information on the quality of natural resources 
management for a broad number of countries (like those considered in this 
study), these conjectures cannot be thoroughly and empirically tested. 
Contingent to the availability of this type of data, further analysis 
investigating the role of the governance dimension in assessing natural 
resources management, and particularly in shedding light on the effects of 
policy and institutions on natural resource-rich countries’ economic 
outcomes, would likely further the understanding of these phenomena. At the 
same time, the heterogeneous results obtained by distinguishing between 
higher- and lower-income countries strongly suggest that the policy 
framework plays a decisive role in determining whether natural resources are 




Chapter 3:  
Fiscal Incentive and Firm’s Performance. Evidence 























                                                          
22 This analysis was conducted jointly with Alessandra Amendola, Marinella Boccia, and Luca Sensini, 







Fiscal policy is among the most important means through which governments 
influence the business cycle. Sound fiscal policies can promote sustained and 
inclusive development and reinforce both social and economic stability. Tax 
expenditures, which are fiscally equivalent to more traditional forms of public 
spending, can play an important role in attracting specific types of private 
investment and rewarding the production of positive externalities. Tax 
expenditures include tax exemptions, deductions, tax holidays, and other 
policies that reduce the tax liability of specific sectors, firms, and individuals. 
The unique features of tax expenditures have made them both popular and 
controversial. Unlike public spending, tax expenditures are embedded in the 
tax code and are not recorded as outlays in the annual budget. They increase 
the complexity of the tax code, which raises both the private cost of tax 
compliance and the public cost of tax enforcement, while expanding 
opportunities for fraud. 
Although tax exemptions are often intended to advance worthwhile policy 
goals, their public benefits can be difficult to gauge, while their private 
benefits create a strong incentive for firms and investors to lobby for 
preferential tax treatment, even when such treatment serves no clear policy 
objective.  
Like many other countries, the Dominican Republic (DR) has introduced 
various tax expenditures designed to advance strategic development 
objectives. To use tax expenditures effectively, policy-makers must 
understand how they affect firm incentives and impact performance. Over the 




determinants of firm productivity, competitiveness, and growth and the effect 
of taxation on these and other performance variables. Some studies have 
found that fiscal incentives can spur investment, create jobs, and generate 
other social and economic benefits (Bora, 2002). However, other research 
suggests that the costs of fiscal incentives both in foregone revenue and via 
their adverse effects on governance outweigh the benefits (Cleeve, 2008). 
Microeconomic analyses have yielded mixed results. Firms that receive tax 
incentives appear to exhibit faster growth, better performance and a positive 
impact on firm productivity. However sometimes tax incentives and 
subsidized credit were not correlated with changes in total factor productivity. 
This paper contributes to the international literature by examining the impact 
of fiscal incentives on firm performance in the DR. The analysis is based on 
a firm-level dataset from 2006 to 2015, which the Dominican authorities 
provided to the World Bank. 
The most relevant contribution of this analysis is related to the possible policy 
implications: in fact, as our results show, the existing exemption regime 
appears to directly affect the performance - and therefore the competitiveness 
- of firms, and thus the overall productivity of the economy. In particular, 
reducing the proven tax liabilities divide between the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) and non-SEZ firms would alleviate distortions and promote 
economy-wide competitiveness, thus contributing to put to an end the 
country’s dual production and export structure. 
In this paper a propensity score matching methodology was employed to 
investigate the potential impacts above described, considering various 
indicators of: Liquidity, GFSAL, ROS, ROA, STS and Turnover, as proxies 
of a firm’s welfare. The analysis employs both a Nearest Neighbor Matching 
and a Radius Matching, as well as it allows for a covariates balancing test, in 




The paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, the following 
(second) section reviews the literature on the impact of fiscal incentive on 
firm’s economic performance. The third section analyzes the role of the fiscal 
incentive23. The data and the empirical strategy are described respectively in 
the fourth and fifth sections. The sixth section is devoted to some descriptive 
statistics. The results are presented in the seventh section. Finally, the eighth 







Many studies have attempted to evaluate the impact of fiscal incentives on 
firms’ performance. These analyses have examined fiscal incentives in a wide 
range of countries and for a diverse set of reasons. Examining the effect of 
tax incentives on firms’ gross sales and value added in Uganda, Mayende 
(2013) found that streamlining the tax-incentive structure would improve 
firms overall performance. 
Ohaka and Agundu (2012) concluded that tax incentives had successfully 
increased the productivity and competitiveness of strategic sectors in Nigeria. 
Using propensity score matching, Rapuluchukwu et al. (2016) found that 
multiple types of fiscal incentives including import duty exemptions, profit 
tax exemptions, and export financing had a positive effect on firm 
productivity. 
                                                          




Czarnitzki et al. (2011) also used a non-parametric matching approach to 
examine the effects of research and development (RD) tax credits on 
innovation among Canadian manufacturers and found that firms that received 
tax credits scored higher on most but not all performance indicators and that 
tax credits lead to additional innovation output. Lee (1996) examined the 
impact of the Korean government’s industrial-promotion and trade-protection 
policies on productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, finding that 
while trade protections such as tariffs and import restrictions were negatively 
correlated with value addition, capital formation, and total factor productivity, 
industrial promotion policies and tax incentives in particular were positively 
correlated with increased output and higher rates of capital formation. 
For governments around the world, increasing firm productivity is a critical 
policy goal. UNCTAD (2015) describes improving firm productivity as a path 
to sustainable industrial development.  
In some cases, policymakers may regard the strategic allocation of fiscal 
incentives to firms and sectors as a way to offset the negative impact of an 
inhospitable business environment (Gui-Diby and Renard, 2015; UNCTAD, 
2015). Yet despite their flaws, policy makers continue to embrace fiscal 
incentives as a viable tool for attracting and sustaining investment. To 
maximize their effectiveness while managing their externalities, some 
countries have attempted to directly link fiscal incentives to firm performance 
and narrowly tailor them to advance specific development goals (UNCTAD, 
2004). Due to their diverse design features and the unique characteristics of 
each country’s political and economic context, the impact of fiscal incentives 
on firm productivity varies from case to case. 
It is pertinent to highlight also the strand of literature referring to the principle 
of impartiality of the State in the economy, and to a more recent strand 




Investment (e.g. Porter and Kramer, 2011), which essentially refer to the fact 
that corporate practices have the capacity of boosting the efficiency of a firm 
while – at the same time – pushing the agenda on social and economic macro 
issues; in other words, this refers to how private sector’s choices can 
strengthen a symbiotic link between core business goals and the aspirations 
of a society.  
Corporate Income Tax in the DR 
Corporate income tax (CIT) is the Dominican Republic’s second-largest 
source of tax revenue. It accounts for close to 20 percent of total tax revenues, 
and was equivalent to 1.6 percent of GDP (average 2002-15). Its rate in the 
Dominican Republic is among the highest in the region at 27 percent, but its 
revenue efficiency falls short vis-à-vis most comparator countries (Graph 
1)24.  
Graph 1. CIT Revenue efficiencies, DR and Regional Comparators, 2015 (source: WB) 
 
                                                          





In the DR, tax expenditures significantly weaken revenue mobilization and 
further constrain the governments already limited fiscal space. Despite recent 
efforts to boost tax efficiency, total public revenues reached just 14.6 percent 
of GDP in 2016, well below the peak of 16.6 percent observed in 2007. As a 
result, the DRs tax revenues are below the world average and far below the 








In recent years, the DRs tax expenditures have exceeded 6 percent of GDP, 
and they represent a larger share of total public spending than in many 
comparator countries. Tax expenditures include tax exemptions, deductions, 
tax holidays, and other policies that reduce the tax liability of specific sectors, 
firms, and individuals. The DRs tax expenditures are ostensibly designed to 
promote various economic development objectives, and since 2008 the 
                                                          




government has systematically monitored tax expenditures and published the 
estimated foregone revenue in a dedicated budget annex. 
The DRs tax expenditures have become increasingly costly over time: total  
foregone revenue rose from 5.5 percent of GDP in 2010-13 to 6.6 percent in 
2014-16. The country’s National Development Strategy 2030 includes a plan 
to consolidate all existing tax-expenditure schemes into a single section of the 
tax code and to establish a coherent and sustainable approach to tax 
expenditures that reduces their fiscal impact and minimizes their distortive 
effect on economic incentives. The largest category of tax expenditures are 
exemptions and deductions from the DRs value-added tax (VAT), which is 
known as the Tax on the Transfer of Industrial Goods and Services (Impuesto 
sobre Transferencias de Bienes Industrializados y Servicios, ITBIS). Other 
major tax-expenditure categories include preferential rates for fuel products, 
estate tax deductions, and CIT incentives. Most of the latter accrue to firms 
located in SEZs. The CIT is subject to a complex and generous array of 
exemptions and tax credits, as well as long periods during which these 
exemptions can be claimed. In total, the DRs CIT expenditures equal close to 
1 percent of GDP. Special CIT regimes apply to firms located in SEZs, 
tourism-development clusters, and specially designated regions, and many 
individual firms can claim additional exceptions to the standard regime. 
Under Law 8-1990, firms established in SEZs are fully exempt from the CIT, 
ITBIS, and all local taxes. Law 158-2001 exempts firms working in several 
tourism-development clusters from the CIT, ITBIS, and other taxes and fees. 
Law 195-2013 extended the tax exemption for newly established firms from 
10 to 15 years. Law 28-2001 exempts firms located in border regions from 
the CIT and ITBIS, while Law 108-2010 provides tax incentives to firms 
related to the film industry, and Law 66-1997 provides incentives to 




impact of ITBIS incentives in the DR, the effects of CIT expenditures on 
investment and growth has yet to be fully assessed. The following analysis is 




Graph 3. Tax expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(source: authors based on national authorities’ data) 
 Most recent year 
Dominican Republic  6.5 (2016) 
Uruguay  6,3 (2014) 
Ecuador  4,6 (2016) 
Chile 4,2 (2016) 
Brasil 4.2 (2016) 
Argentina 2,8 (2016) 
Guatemala 2.5 (2015) 






Data from tax returns can be used to analyze whether the DRs CIT-related tax 
expenditures correlate with significant difference in firm-level outcome 
indicators. In 2016, the Ministry of Finance provided an anonymized CIT 
dataset to the World Bank as a part of the authorities ongoing fiscal policy 




2015 from more than 180,000 firms in 31 provinces. Though anonymized, the 
dataset contains important information about firm characteristics, including 
the economic sectors in which the firms operate, their ownership and capital 
structures, and their performance as measured by the outcome indicators 
described below. The dataset also records estimated forgone CIT revenue for 
each firm i.e., the amount of tax each firm did not pay due to fiscal incentives.  
Researchers rarely have access to such extensive and detailed tax information, 
and analyzing this dataset may yield important insights into the much debated 





The analysis utilized a propensity score matching estimator. This 
methodology (Rubin, 1977; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 
1997) is a statistical technique that can evaluate the effect of a treatment (for 
example, a program or public policy) by comparing treated (so-called 
treatment group) and untreated units (so-called control group). 
The goal of the matching is to find, for every treated firm, one or more 
untreated firms that have similar observable characteristics but do not have 
access to a given (for instance) public program (Brodaty et al., 2007). 
Once the matching has been conducted, the average treatment effect can be 
calculated for the group with access to the program (Average Treatment effect 
on the Treated or ATT). The counterfactual analysis enables to identify 




Let  Ti  be a binary variable which takes the value  Ti = 1 for firms i having 
access to the treatment (Fiscal Incentive) and  Ti = 0 for non-treated firms. 
Let Y be the potential outcomes of the treatment: Liquidity, GFSAL, ROS, 
ROA, STS and Turnover. For example, considering Yi1 is the amount of 
Turnover of a firm i which has access to the treatment and Yi0 is the amount 
of turnover of a firm i which does not have access to the treatment. The 
average treatment effect on the treated will be: 
 
Since a given firm cannot simultaneously receive and not receive the 
treatment, E(Yi0|Ti = 1) is not observable. E(Yi0|Ti = 0) can be substituted to 
E(Yi0|Ti = 1) because the first is an observable quantity. Yet, doing this 
assumes that the behavior of a treated firm is identical to that of a non-treated, 
which holds true only if treated units have the same characteristics as the 
untreated ones. In order to verify this, we need two identifying assumptions: 
the common support condition and the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA). 
The common support condition requires the presence of sufficient overlap 
across treated and non-treated firms’ samples. The CIA instead assumes that 
there is a vector of firm characteristics (area, economic activity, cost of 
employees, value of building and so on) that describe the firm, irrespective of 
them having access to the treatment or not. On such assumption, let X be the 






Subsequently, the available information based on untreated units is used to 
build a counterfactual for each treated unit. This counterfactual measures how 
the beneficiaries of the exemption would have been, otherwise, in the absence 
of the given intervention (Bonnard, 2011). 
Conditionally to the vector X of firm characteristics, the non-observable 
counterfactual E(Yi0 |Ti = 1)) is estimated by E(Yi0 |Ti = 0)). This estimation 
calls for the careful choice of the covariates belonging to vector X. On the 
one hand, the more accurate the vector X (i.e. the larger the vector X) is, the 
better the matching process will be. Yet the larger vector X, the harder it will 
be to find an identical untreated unit (i.e. with exactly the same set of 
characteristics) for each treated unit. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest matching units using a propensity 
score built on the basis of vector X to overcome the problem of the size of 
vector X. The propensity score P(X) is the probability of a firm to belong to 
the treatment group (i.e. having access to the program) given the vector X of 
firm characteristics. As Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) put it:  
P(X) = P (Ti = 1 | X). 
Thus, the property of independence conditional on vector X is also true for 
P(X). This probability is estimated for the whole sample (treated and 
untreated units) using a multivariate estimation such as a logit or probit 
model. In this estimation, the dependent variable is the access or the lack of 
the access to the policy (i.e. in our case, benefitting from fiscal incentives) 
and vector X is used as an explanatory variable. As such, the estimated 
coefficients give the propensity score for each firm.  
In line with the common support assumptions, the matching process requires 




is not too far removed from the users score. Given the above, the average 
effect of the treatment on the treated units is: 
 
Variables choice 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) argument about the inclusion (or exclusion) of 
covariates in the propensity score model. The matching strategy builds on the 
Conditional Independent assumption(CIA), requiring the outcome variable(s) 
to be independent of the treatment conditional on the propensity score. Hence, 
implementing the matching requires choosing a set of variables X that 
credibly satisfy this condition.  
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) show that omitting important variables 
may severely increase the risk of bias in the resulting estimates. The only 
variables to be included should influence simultaneously the decision to 
participate and the outcome variable(s) (see also Smith and Todd (2005) or 
Sianesi (2004)). 
It should also be clear that only the variables that are unaffected by the 
participation (or the anticipation of it) should be included in the model. To 
ensure this, variables should either be fixed over time or measured before the 
participation. In the latter case, it must be certain that the variable has not been 
influenced by the anticipation of participation. For this reason, in this analysis 
the outcome variables are taken at time t, the treatment (Corporate Income 
Tax exemption) at time t-1 and the covariates (Value of Buildings, Capital 
Stock, Land ’s Ownership and Cost of employee) at time t-2; while the other 








Variables of Interest 
 
To estimate the impact of CIT exemptions, several outcome indicators were 
selected as proxies of firms’ performance. The profits of firms become 
income for share-holders and generate spillover and multiplier effects at the 
individual, household, and economy-wide level. Profitable firms attract more 
investors and raise greater amounts of capital to possibly finance larger scale 
and/or more sophisticated projects. Profitable firms also tend to employ more 
workers and have a greater impact on growth and poverty reduction.  
Previous studies have typically approached the concept of firm performance 
from one of two perspectives. The first uses financial information to evaluate 
performance in monetary terms. The second uses non-financial information 
to assess aspects of performance that are more difficult to quantify. This 
analysis takes the first approach, leveraging the tax information provided by 
the government to assess the value generated by each firm in quantifiable 
fiscal and financial terms. The fiscal outcome indicators are the amount of 
CIT revenue paid by each firm and the amount of CIT revenue foregone due 
to fiscal incentives. The financial outcome indicators, which are proxies for 
firm performance, include measures of liquidity, operating structure, 
profitability, and turnover, each of which is expressed as a ratio (Table 2). 
The outcome indicators include one measure of liquidity that is the ratio of 
current assets to fixed assets, and two variables related to the firms’ operating 
structure, the ratio of gross financial expenses to sales (GFSAL) and the ratio 




measure of profitability that is not affected by whether the assets are financed 
by creditors or shareholders. Finally, the ratio of sales to total assets (STS) 
and the ratio of sales to current assets represent measures of the turnover. 
These outcome indicators are the dependent variables of this analysis. 
Selected covariates 
 
Several additional firm characteristics are used as covariates. These include 
the capital stock, which sums the value of a firm’s machinery and equipment 
and reflects its productive capacity (Arnold, Mattoo and Narciso (2008), 
Clarke (2012), and Rapuluchukwu et al. (2016)); the value of buildings, which 
reflects the quality of a firm’s facilities and environs; the total cost of wage, 
which can be used as a measure of human capital (Arnold, Mattoo and 
Narciso, 2008) and the value of urban land owned by the firm is treated as a 
proxy for firm size. Firm size is an especially crucial explanatory variable, 
because larger firms tend to have greater productive capacity and resources, 
which enables them to take advantage of economies of scale. Large firms are 
also more likely to have access to qualified personnel. They tend to be more 
diversified, and are generally better able to weather economic shocks. 
Consequently, firm size is positively correlated with profitability. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that confirming Baumols size-profits hypothesis, 
Hall and Weiss (1967) also found a positive relationship between firm size 
and firm profitability, and this relationship was further supported by the 
findings of Nunes et al. (2008) and Babalola (2013).  
Other explanatory variables are also included in the analysis. The impact of a 
firm’s geographic location is accounted for by considering the provinces in 




advantages. The descriptions of both the outcomes of interest and the 
covariates selected are presented in the following tables (1 and 2). 
 









Liquidity Current assets to Fixed assets Liquidity 
GFSAL  Financial Expenses to Sales Operating Structure 
Return on Sales ( ROS) Net Operating Income to Sales Operating Structure 
Return on Assets ROA Net Income to Total assets Profitability 
STS Sales to Total Assets Turnover 
Turnover Sales to Current assets Turnover 
 
 







Capital stock Value of a Firm’s Machinery and Equipment 
Building Value of Buildings-capturing the firm’s dimension 
Employees Cost Total Cost of Wage 
Urban Land Value of Land 
Economic Activities 
Dummies for Economic activities: Public 
administration; Rental; Trade; Communications; 
Construction, Grain Crop, Traditional Crops; 
Electricity, Gas and Water; Mining and Quarrying; 
Livestock, Forestry and Fisheries; Hotels Bars and 
Restaurants; Financial Intermediation, Insurance and 
Others; Manufacturing; Other Services; Agricultural 
Services; Teaching; Health Services, Transportation 
and Storage 







The information regarding the materialization or not of fiscal incentives 
(given by the government to specific firms) is captured by the data. The 
treatment variable is a dummy variable called ‘Corporate Income Tax’ that 
takes the value of one if firms receive the Fiscal Incentive and pay no tax, or 
a value of zero otherwise. As clarified, the dataset provides exact information 
about the recipients of these incentives and their materialization. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
This section summarizes the differences in the characteristics between 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary firms (Table 3). After carrying out the t-tests 
for continuous variables, the results suggest that there were differences among 
some of the firms that have access to the Corporate Income Tax exemption in 
most of the selected covariates. We also performed a chi-square test for 
categorical variables, but do not report it for brevity. All in all, causal 
inference requires to control for potential sources of bias; which is the reason 
why this analysis opted for a propensity score matching method. 
 








Capital stock 3179562 6157773 *** 
Building 1.08e+07 1.05e+07 ns 
Employees Cost 6827028 1.12e+07 *** 
Urban Land 4441331 5498850 ** 
Notes:* Significant at 10 per cent;** significant at 5 per cent;*** significant at 1 





This section presents the results of the evaluation impact of Corporate Income 
Tax exemption in the Dominican Republic. The first part will discuss the 
determinants of such benefits, allowing for a Probit estimation; while the 
second part analyzes the effects of these incentives on firm’s welfare, through 
a Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) and a Radius Matching (RM) 
estimation methods. 
  
Determinants of Fiscal Incentives 
In carrying out a PSM, the first step is to estimate the propensity scores for 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary firms. Table 4 reports the Probit model 
estimates of marginal effects for various observables. The likelihood of 
receiving the Incentive (i.e. Corporate Income Tax exemption) positively and 
significantly depends on most of the economic activities considered, except 
for Trade, Teaching and Health Services, for which a negative and significant 
evidence is reported.  
As for the geographic determinants, the localization in the Provinces of Alt- 
agracia, Azua, Districto Nacional, La Romana, Montecristi, Puetro Plada, 
Samana, San Cristobal, San Pedro de Macoris, Santo Domingo appears to be 
an important factor to receive the benefits, while a negative or not significant 
result is evidenced for the other provinces. 
Finally, firms with a higher value of buildings and land are most likely to be 










Table 4: determinants of Corporate Income Tax 
VARIABLES Corporate Income Tax 
    
ALTAGRACIA 0.354***(0.0566) 
AZUA 0.213** (0.0948) 
  




DAJABON 0.00299 (0.221) 
  
DISTRITO NACIONAL 0.190***(0.0519) 
DUARTE -0.0395 (0.0641) 
  
EL SEYBO -0.371***(0.104) 
  
PESPAILLAT -0.311***(0.0637) 
HATO MAYOR -0.00699(0.0955) 
INDIPENDENCIA 0.155(0.193) 
LA ROMANA 0.455***(0.0563) 
LAVEGA 0.0288(0.0573) 
MARIA TRINIDAD SANCHEZ 0.109(0.0770) 
MONSEOR NOUEL -0.107(0.0755) 




PUERTO PLATA 0.223***(0.0552) 
SALCEDO -0.264***(0.0867) 
SAMANA 0.810***(0.0651) 
SAN CRISTOBAL 0.247***(0.0563) 
SAN JOSE DE OCOA -0.265*(0.160) 
SAN JUAN DE LAMAGUANA -0.221***(0.0835) 
SAN PEDRO DE MACORIS 0.222***(0.0607) 
SANCHEZ RAMIREZ -0.155*(0.0805) 
SABTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS 0.0265 (0.0528) 
SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ -0.189(0.142) 
SANTO DOMINGO 0.185***(0.0523) 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 0.236(0.202) 




GRAIN CROP  0.0700(0.0765) 
TRADITIONAL  CROP  0.315***(0.0418) 
ELETTRICITY, GASW, WATER -0.0534(0.0450) 
MINE AND QUARRIG 0.445***(0.0814) 
LIVESTOCK, FORESTRY AND FISHERIES 0.254***(0.0404) 
HOTEL, BAR , RESTAURANTS 0.340***(0.0251) 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, INSURANCE 0.493***(0.0213) 
MANUFACTURING 0.219***(0.0188) 
OTHER SERVICES 0.249***(0.0175) 
AGRICULTURE SERVICES 0.356***(0.0371) 
TEACHING -0.236***(0.0371) 
HEALTH SERVICES -0.286***(0.0282) 
Capital Stock 3.58e-11 ( 5.39e-11) 
Building 2.05e-10 ***( 3.12e-11 ) 
Employee's Cost -1.17e-09 ***(1.32e-10) 
Land's Ownership 1.24e-10 ***( 4.64e-11) 
Constant -0.743 ***(0.0539) 
Observations 152,357 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Types of Matching employed 
The estimated scores are then used for matching the participating and non-
participating firms. The techniques that have been used in the matching 
process are: Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) and Radius Matching (RM). 
The NNM consists of matching each treated firm with the control firms that 
have the closest propensity score. As usual, we apply this method through 
replacement, which means that a control unit can be a best match for more 
than one treated unit. However, there may be problems of poor matching if 
the propensity scores are too far from one another. So, before performing the 
matching, a common support region is defined. In the Radius Matching (RM) 
approach, a firm from the control group is chosen as a matching partner for a 
participant that lies within the specified radius in terms of propensity score. 
Table 5 reports the results related to NNM and RM for all the outcomes of 
interest and shows (for both the types of Matching employed) positive effects 

















Table 5 Propensity Score Matching-Results 
VARIABLES Nearest Neighbor Matching Radius Matching 
Liquidity 
Number of treated units 
Number of untreated units 







Number of treated units 








Number of treated units 
Number of untreated units 








Number of treated units 










Number of treated units 








Number of treated units 
Number of untreated units 






Notes: * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Robustness and Balancing Test 
This analysis also doublechecked the robustness of ATT estimations through 
different matching algorithms, obtaining positive confirmation that the ATT 
estimations are robust across them. Moreover, the Propensity score estimation 
warrants a balance in the distribution of independent variables in the two 
groups of firms (beneficiaries and not). Figure 1 and 2 show the distribution 
and common support for the propensity score estimation both for the NNM 




common support, indicating that all treated firms have corresponding 
untreated firms. 
 
Figure 1: Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) 
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Figure 2: Radius Matching (RM) 
 
 




Matching Balancing Test 
The conclusive results of this analysis (Table 6 and 7) indicate that there was 
a substantial reduction in both the mean and median bias as a result of the 
matching, which strengthens the robustness of the results. 
Moreover, the results of the pseudo-R2 after the matching were all lower than 
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after the matching there are no systematic differences in the distribution of 
covariates between treated and control firms. 
Also, the value of B, that is the absolute standardized difference of the means 
of the linear index of the propensity in the treated and (matched) non-treated 
group, and R, that is the ratio of treated to (matched) non-treated variances of 
the propensity score index are both within the Rubin’s parameters. 
 
Table 6: Balancing Test-Results-NNM 









































































Notes: The table reports the Ps R2, that is the Pseudo R2 from Probit estimation of the conditional treatment 
probability (propensity score) on all the variables before and after matching, the mean and median bias as summary 
indicators of the distribution of the abs(bias),the Rubins' B (the absolute standardized difference of the means of the 
linear index of the propensity score in the treated and (matched) non-treated group) and the Rubin's R (the ratio of 
treated to (matched) non-treated variances of the propensity score index). Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less 
than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be considered sufficiently balanced. An 










Table 7: Balancing Test-Results-RM 









































































Notes: The table reports the Ps R2, that is the Pseudo R2 from Probit estimation of the conditional treatment 
probability (propensity score) on all the variables before and after matching, the mean and median bias as summary 
indicators of the distribution of the abs(bias),the Rubins' B (the absolute standardized difference of the means of the 
linear index of the propensity score in the treated and (matched) non-treated group) and the Rubin's R (the ratio of 
treated to (matched) non-treated variances of the propensity score index). Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less 
than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be considered sufficiently balanced. An 















 Policy Conclusions 
 
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of CIT Incentives on firms’ 
performance in the Dominican Republic, by applying a propensity score 
matching to a database provided by country authorities to the World Bank. 
The results provide clear and compelling evidence that firm receiving 
incentives outperform their peers on a wide range of financial metrics of 
interest. The estimations are robust to all the types of matching considered 
(Nearest Neighbor Matching and Radius Matching) and support the balancing 
test. In line with these results authorities should consider levelling the playing 
field by reducing or rationalizing CIT incentives. Firms located in SEZs tend 
to benefit most from fiscal incentives, and receive a full and permanent 
exemption from CIT.  
As the analysis shows, the existing CIT exemptions regime directly affects 
the firm performance, with negative implications for competition, and thus 
the overall economic productivity. Reducing the asymmetry in the tax 
treatment between SEZ and non-SEZ firms could alleviate distortions as a 
first step toward phasing out the DR’s dual production and export structure26, 
although this may likely face strong opposition from vested interests. 
Increasing the neutrality of the tax system would also help fighting tax 







                                                          







Chapter 1:  
 
Armendáriz, B. & Morduch, J.  (2010). The economics of microfinance (2nd ed.). Cambridge 
MA.: The MIT press. 
Attanasio, O., Battistin, E.  & Padula, M.  (2010). Inequality and Living Standards since 
1980. American        Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Press.  
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/22684. 
Banerjee, A., Duflo, E.,  Glennerster, R.,  & Kinnan, C. (2015). The miracle of Microfinance? 
Evidence from a   Randomized Evaluation. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 7 (1), 22-53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20130533. 
Beck, T., Demirgűç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2007). Finance, Inequality and Poor: Cross 
Country Evidence. Journal of Economic Growth, 12 (1), 27-49. http:// 
doi.org/10.1007/s10887-007-9010-6. 
Becker, A. & Woessmann, L.  (2009). Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of 
Protestant Economic History. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2), 531-596. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.531 
Boonperm,J., Haughton, J.,  & Khandker, S. R.  (2013). Does the Village Fund matter in 
Thailand?Evaluating the impact on incomes and spending. Journal of Asian Economies, 
25, 3-16.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2013.01.001. 
Burgess, R. & Pande, R.  (2003). Do rural banks matter? Evidence from the Indian social 
banking experiment. The American Economic Review, 95 (3), 780-795. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201242 
Ciang, T.T.,  Wang, G., , & Chien,  N.D. (2015). How Credit affects the poor household 
Expenditure? A case study of Vietnam. Journal of Finance and Economics, 3 (1), 31-43. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.12735/jfe.v3i1p31 
Diagne, A. & Zeller, M.  (2001). Access to Credit and its Impact on Welfare in Malawi. 
International Food Policy Research Institute. Research Report, 116. 
Desai, J., Johnson, K.,  & Tarozzi, A.  (2015). The Impacts of Microcredit: Evidence from 
Ethiopia. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7 (1), 54-89. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20130475 
Honohan, P. (2004). Financial Development, Growth and Poverty: How Close Are the Links? 
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3023). Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14439 
Honohan, P. & M. King (2012). Cause and Effects Access: Cross-Country Evidence  From 
the Finscope Survey. IIIS Discussion paper No.339. 
Kaboski, J.P. & Townsend, R.M.  (2012). The Impact of Credit on Village Economies. 
American Economic, Journal: Applied Economics, 4 (2), 98–133. 
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.4.2.98 
Karlan, D. & Zinman, J.  (2010). Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply 





Khandker, S.R. & Faruqee, R.R.  (2003). The Impact of Farm Credit in Pakistan. Agricultural  
Economics, 28 (3), 197-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0169-5150(03)00017-3 
Khandker, S.R. (2005). Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from 
Bangladesh. The World Bank Economic Review, 19, 263-286. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhi008 
Mahjabeen, R. (2008). Microfinance in Bangladesh: Impact on households, consumption and 
welfare. Journal of Policy Modeling, 30 (6), 1083–1092. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2007.12.007 
Mosley, P. & Hulme, D.  (1998). Microenterprice Finance: is there a conflict between 
Growth and Poverty Alleviation?. World Development, 26 (5), 783-790. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00021-7 
Morduch, J. (1998). Does microfinance really helps the poor? New evidence from Flagship 
programs in Bangladesh. New York University. New York, NY: NYU Wagner. 
Morduch, J. & Haley, B.  (2002). Analysis of the Effects of Microfinance on Poverty 
Reduction. NYU Wagner Working Paper No. 1014. New York, NY: NYU Wagner. 
Pitt, M. & Khandker, S.R.  (1998).The impact of group-based credit on poor households in 
Bangladesh: Does the gender of participants matter? Journal of Political Economy, 106 
(5), 958-996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/250037 
Robinson, M.S. (2001). The microfinance revolution: Sustainable finance for the poor (Vol. 
1). Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
Notes 
Note 1. See, e.g., Pitt and Khandker (1998), Robinson (2001); Morduch & Haley (2002); 
Khandker (2003); Mahjabeen (2008); Armendáriz & Morduch, (2010); Boonperm, 
Haughton, Khandker, (2013); and Kaboski and Townsend, (2012). 
Note 2. Given the limitation of data it was no possible to distinguish between access to credit 
from banks or from other institutions. 
Note 3. See, e.g., Pitt and Khandker (1998), and Kaboski and Townsend (2012). 
Note 4. Cf. ONS 2013, « Recensement général de la population » http://www.ons.mr. 
Note 5. ONS-ILO Joint Labor Survey, 2013. 
Note 6. Mauritania Economic Update 2014, World Bank. 
Note 7. World Bank, 2007. 
Note 8. Cf. Mauritania Country Partnership Strategy, World Bank, 2013. 
Note 9. World Bank. 2013. 
Note 10.  Ibidem. 
Note 11. African Development Fund (2007). Mauritania Appraisal Report, PRECAMF. 
Note 12. See also Attanasio, Battistin and Padula (2010) for a discussion. 
Note 13. The value of consumption of household production, total spending on nondurable 
goods and food spending are equivalised considering per capita expenditure. Expenditures 
are measured in “milliers d'ouguiyas”. 
Note 14. The analysis below was also performed by region. This is not reported in its entirety 
for reasons of brevity. Mauritania’s territory was divided into three macro zones, by 
clustering regions: Zone 1 (Nouakchott, Dakhlett Nouadibou) Zone 2 (Gorgol, Brakma, 
Traza, Guidimagha) and Zone 3 (Hodh Charghy, Hodh Gharby.Assaba, Adrar, Tagant, Tirs-




subnational level. Zone 1 represents the most populated and urbanized areas, some of the 
most productive and economically active in the country. Zone 2 corresponds roughly to the 
Senegal valley regions; these areas are structurally different from the Sahelian regions, as 
they rely more on agricultural activities and are significantly less sparsely populated than 
desert areas. Zone 3 is obtained as a residual. The analysis by macro areas showed that the 
zone 1 presented a positive effect of access to credit on education expenditure and poverty 
reduction. A negative effect on self-production was found for the other two macro areas. 
Note 15. See also Pitt and Khandker (1998) for a discussion. 
Note 16. Meaning, if the analysis is repeated by omitting some of the distances, the results 
do not change. 
Note 17. An analogous approach was employed by Becker and Woessmann, (2009), who 
showed that Protestantism had a strong effect on literacy by using “Distance to Wittenberg” 
as an instrument for the share of Protestants in each county. They corroborate the identifying 
assumption by showing that distance to Wittenberg is indeed unrelated to a series of proxies 
for economic and educational development before 1517, including the pre-Luther placement 
of schools, universities, monasteries, and free imperial and Hanseatic cities. 
Note 18. The analysis was computed between the two variables (separately). 
Note 19. Computed from the main sample. 
 
Chapter 2:  
 
Alessandrini, Michele and Tullio Buccellato. 2009. “Natural Resources: A Blessing or a 
Curse? The Role of Inequality.” Discussion Paper 98 2009(October). 
Barbier, Edward B. 2014. “Account for Depreciation of Natural Capital.” Nature 515:32–33. 
Barbier, Edward B. 2015. “Wealth Inequality.” Pp. 1–30 in Nature and Wealth, vol. 1, edited 
by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Retrieved (http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781107415324A009). 
Barro, Robert J. and Jong Wha Lee. 2013. “A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in 
the World, 1950–2010.” Journal of Development Economics 104:184–98. Retrieved 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.10.001). 
Behzadan, Nazanin, Richard Chisik, Harun Onder, and Bill Battaile. 2017. “Does Inequality 
Drive the Dutch Disease? Theory and Evidence.” Journal of International Economics 
106:104–18. Retrieved (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.02.003). 
Brahmbhatt, M., O. Canuto, and E. Vostroknutova. 2010. “Dealing with Dutch Disease.” 
World Bank’s PREM Economic Premise series (16). 
Brunnscheweiler, Christa N., and Bulte Erwin H. 2008. "The resource curse revisited and 
revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings." Journal of Environemntal Economics 
and Management 55 (2008) 248-264. 
Bunte, Jonas. 2011. “Why Does the Severity of the Dutch Disease Vary across Countries ?” 
Pp. 1–29 in International Political Economy Society Conference Paper. Retrieved 
(https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2011/papers/S900_rm2.pdf). 
Darvas, Zsolt. 2012. Real Effective Exchange Rates for 178 Countries: A New Database. 
Dasgupta, Partha. 2010. “The Place of Nature in Economic Development.” Pp. 4977–5046 
in Handbook of Development Economics, vol. 5, Handbook of Development 





Fum, Ruikang Marcus and Roland Hodler. 2010. “Natural Resources and Income Inequality: 
The Role of Ethnic Divisions.” Economics Letters 107(3):360–63. Retrieved 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.008). 
Furtado, Celso. 1968. "The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern 
Times". University of California Press, Berkeley 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur. 2001. “Nature, Power and Growth.” Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 48(5):558–88. Retrieved (http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1467-9485.00215). 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur and Gylfi Zoega. 2002. Inequality and Economic Growth: Do Natural 
Resources Matter ? 
van der Ploeg, F. and S. Poelhekke. 2009. “Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse.” 
Oxford Economic Papers 61(4):727–60. Retrieved 
(https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/oep/gpp027). 
Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. “Political Foundations of the 
Resource Curse.” Journal of Development Economics 79(2):447–68. Retrieved 
(http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304387806000137). 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew Warner. 1995. Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Growth. Cambridge, MA. Retrieved (http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398.pdf). 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. 1999. “The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms 
and Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 59(1):43–76. Retrieved 
(http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S030438789900005X). 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. 2001. “The Curse of Natural Resources.” European 




Chapter 3:  
 
Alvarez,  R. and Crespi,  G. and Cuevas,  C. (2012), Public Programs, Innovation, and Firm 
Performance in Chile, Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
Arnold, J., Mattoo, A., and Narciso, G., (2008), Services Inputs and Firm Productivity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Firm-Level Data, Journal of African Economies, 
17(4): 578-599.  
 
Bora, B. (2002) Investment Distortions and the International Policy Architecture, World 
Trade Organisation, Working Paper, Geneva. Retrieved from 
https://core.ac.uk/download/files/35/272221.pdf Bureau of Economic and Business 
Affairs (2013), 2013 Investment Climate Statement – Cameroon, Retrieved from 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204615.htm. 
Brodaty T., Crepon B., Fougre D. (2007), Les mthodes microconomtriques d'evaluation et 
leurs applications aux politiques actives de lemploi , Economie et Prvision, Vol.1, 
n177, pp.93-118. 
 
Cleeve, E., (2008), How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives to Attract FDI to Sub-Saharan 





Clarke, G. (2012), Manufacturing Firms in Africa: Some Stylized Facts about Wages and 
Productivity , In Dinh, H.T., and Clarke, G.R.G., (Eds.), Performance of Manufacturing 
Firms in Africa: An Empirical Analysis: 47-83, Washington: World Bank. 
 
Caliendo M. and Kopeinig S. (2008), Some pratical guidance for the implementation of 
Propensity Score Matching , Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol.22, No.1, pp. 31-72 
 
Czarnitzk, D., Hanel, P. and Rosa, J.M. (2011), Evaluating the Impact of RD Tax Credits on 
Innovation: A Microeconometric Study on Canadian Firms, Research Policy, Vol.40, 
No.2, pp. 217-229. 
 
Duch N., Montolio S. and D and Mediavilla M. (2007), Evaluation the impact of public 
subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi experimental approach , IEB. 
 
Heckman, J., R. LaLonde, and J. Smith (1999, The Economics and Econometrics of Active 
Labor Market Programs , Handbook of Labor Economics Vol.III, ed. by O. 
Ashenfelter, and D. Card, pp. 18652097. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
 
 Lee, J., (1996), Government Interventions and Productivity Growth, Journal of Economic 
Growth, 1(3): 391- 414. 
 
Leuven, E., and B. Sianesi (2003, PSMATCH2: Stata Module to Perform Full Mahalanobis 
and Propensity Score Matching, Common Support Graphing, and Covariate Imbalance 
Testing ,Software, http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. 
 
Mayende, S., (2013), The Effects of Tax Incentives on Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Uganda, Journal of Politics and Law, 6(4): 95-107. 
 
Ohaka, J., and Agundu, P.U., (2012), Tax Incentives for Industry Synergy in Nigeria: A 
Pragmatic Proprietary System Advocacy, African Research Review, 6(3): 42-58.  
 
Porter, Michael E., and Mark R. Kramer (2011). Creating Shared Value. Harvard Business 
Review 89, nos. 1-2 (Jan–Feb 2011): 62–77 
 
Rapuluchukwu, E. U., Belmondo, T.V. Ibukun, B. (2016), Incentives and Firms Productivity: 
Exploring Multidimensional Fiscal Incentives in a Developing Country, OCP Policy 
Center, Research paper. 
 
Rosembaum P.R. Rubin D.B. (1983), The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects , Biometrika, 70(1), pp. 41-55. 
 




Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score , The American Statistican, 
39, 3338. 
 
Rubin D. (1977), Assignement to Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate, Journal of 
educational Statistics, Vol.2 (1).  
 
Sianesi, B. (2004), An Evaluation of the Active Labour Market Programmes in Sweden, J 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), 133155. 
 
Smith, J.A. Todd, P.E.,(2005), Does matching overcome LaLondes critique of 
nonexperimental estimators? , Journal of Econometrics 125, pp. 305-353. 
 
UNCTAD (2015), Broadening the Sources of Growth in Africa: The Role of Investment, 
Geneva: UNCTAD. 
 
 
 
